Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 48. (2000)
LAVERY, Jason: Emperor Maximilian II. and the Danish-Swedish Struggle for Baltic Hegemony 1563–1576
Obviously, Johan would not have made such a daring ultimatum if he felt that the emperor could call his bluff. In fact, the Swedish king felt so confident that he extended the deadline to 24 June 1577.125 Then, in 1579, Johan officially repudiated all claims by the emperor, now Rudolf II, or the Empire to Livonia.126 Johan’s collusion with Denmark also isolated Lübeck, allowing the Swedish king to avoid his treaty obligations toward the Hanse city. Johan undermined Lübeck’s new privileges as soon as he granted them in 1571. The biggest attack on Lübeck’s prerogatives came when Johan issued in 1574 a charter to Stralsund similar to Lübeck’s. Johan also refused to pay any indemnity and continued to prey on Lübecker ships sailing to Narva.127 The Stettin treaties, nonetheless, did deflect Sweden’s expansionist energies away from the Empire’s vital security interests. Instead of seeking ties with the enemies of the Empire’s internal stability, King Johan III of Sweden worked to improve relations with the emperor by sending delegations to the Imperial court in 1576 and 1579.128 In fact, Johan III was the only pro-Habsburg Swedish monarch of the early modem period. The improvement in relations occurred in spite of Johan’s refusal to relinquish his Livonian conquests, his renewed campaign of piracy, and competition against the Austrian Habsburgs in the elections for the Polish throne in 1573, 1575, and 1587.129 More important to Maximilian and the Empire was that Sweden ceased to threaten the Empire’s internal stability. In fact, Sweden would not directly threaten the Empire again until 1630. Known for his desire for peace within the Empire, Emperor Maximilian II applied the same search for reconciliation to the Empire’s most complex external threat in the immediate post-Augsburg era - the Danish-Swedish rivalry for Baltic hegemony. Even before ascending to the Imperial throne in 1564, Emperor Maximilian II had committed himself to ending the Scandinavian conflict as a means of protecting the Empire’s internal order and external interests. To this end, he sought and achieved a negotiated settlement that would prevent a Swedish victory. Maximilian’s persistence in pursuing such a resolution of the Scandinavian conflict undercuts the widespread understanding of him as a weak and vacillating leader. His only debilitating weakness as a peacemaker was his lack of influence over the combatants. 125 Hoffmann: Sammlung, vol. 1, pp. 540-543. 126 Hildebrand, Karl: Johan III och Europas katolska makter 1568-1580: Studier i 1500-talets politiska historia. Uppsala, 1898, p. 315. 127 Paul: Lübeck und die Wasa, pp. 120-124. 128 Hildebrand, Karl: Johan III och Europas katolska makter, pp. 266-276; 314-318. 129 Relations between Johan and the Habsburgs are covered in Hildebrand: Johan 111 och Europas katolska makter. 227 Emperor Maximilian 11 and the Danish-Swedish Struggle for Baltic Hegemony 1563 - 1576
