Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 46. (1998)
GODSEY, William D. Jr.: Officers vs. Diplomats: Bureaucracy and Foreign Policy in Austria-Hungary 1906–1914
Officers versus Diplomats the primitive state of the Monarchy’s military intelligence apparatus.80 The immediate impetus for the request lay in the archduke’s having learned that the Italian military had stationed two such officers at the embassy in Vienna.81 Given Francis Ferdinand’s well-known aversion to the Italians, his interest in the question at least from that perspective is hardly astonishing. He very likely objected to what he perceived to be an advantage vis-á-vis the Monarchy enjoyed by the Italian army. To comply with the heir’s request, Berchtold first informed himself of the modalities of kommandiert officers assigned abroad by Berlin, Rome and St. Petersburg.82 In letters to the war minister and the archduke, he made no objection in principle to the introduction of the same practice in the Monarchy’s embassies abroad, but rejected the use of any funds from the foreign office for the project. He also ruled out the eventual transfer of such officers into the diplomatic corps.83 Though Berchtold’s stance did reflect a certain resistance, his dissent took the milder form of practical financial considerations rather than the harsher form that Aehrenthal might have registered. In his own reply to Francis Ferdinand, War Minister Krobatin pointed to the same difficulty, but suggested that in the near term the shortfall could be covered by using part of a yearly subsidy (500,000 Kronen in 1913) that the war ministry received from the foreign office. Such a proposal would probably have enjoyed little popularity in the Ballhausplatz, given that 300,000 Kronen of the subsidy was already being used by the Chief of the General Staff for intelligence-gathering purposes. For the long term, beginning with the fiscal year 1915/16, Krobatin agreed to insert the measure into his regular budget for submission to the parliamentary delegations. In closing, Krobatin declared himself immediately prepared to send one officer each to the missions in Rome, Paris and Belgrade, where the military attachés all suffered from an overload of work.84 General Conrad endorsed the war minister’s recommendations, but the sudden death of the archduke put an end to the entire project.85 While Berchtold’s foreign policy took on an increasingly strident tone, a trend that culminated in the ultimatum of 1914, the military simultaneously increased its presence, albeit moderately, among the representatives of the Monarchy abroad. From the beginning of his tenure, with the decision to reverse the longstanding opposition to the posting of an independent military attache in Montenegro, the foreign 80 Conrad: Aus meiner Dienstzeit. Vol. 1, p. 449-51. For Conrad’s difficult relationship with Francis Ferdinand, which especially dated from the middle of 1913, see Kiszling, Rudolf: Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand von Österreich-Este. Leben, Pläne und Wirken am Schicksalsweg der Donaumonarchie. Graz- Köln: Böhlau, 1953), p. 264-7; and Sosnosky, Theodor von: Franz Ferdinand. Der Erzherzog- Thronfolger. München-Berlin: Oldenbourg, 1929), p. 127-131. 81 HHStA, AR, F 6, carton 49, folder Missionen I: Colonel Carl Bardolffto Berchtold, November 12, 1913. 82 Ibidem: Count Ladislaus Szögyény-Marich to Berchtold, November 24, 1913; Cajetan von Mérey (Rome) to Berchtold, December 4, 1913; Count Otto Czemin (St. Petersburg) to Berchtold, December 12, 1913. 83 Ibidem: Berchtold to Krobatin, December 7, 1913; Berchtold to Colonel Carl Bardolff, January 7, 1914. 84 KA, KM Präs. 1913, 47-42/1: Krobatin to Bardolff, draft, ca. December 20, 1913. 83 Ibidem: Bemerkung des k. u. k. Chef des Generalstabes, December 13, 1913. 57
