Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 46. (1998)
GODSEY, William D. Jr.: Officers vs. Diplomats: Bureaucracy and Foreign Policy in Austria-Hungary 1906–1914
Officers versus Diplomats dnd.” Unfortunately for Conrad, his proposal met the unqualified refusal of Francis Joseph, who doubtlessly knew that it enjoyed no support in the Ballhausplatz, even during Aehrenthal’s absence.55 56 On the day before the emperor turned down the Scandinavian plan, and with Aeh- renthal still absent, Conrad officially revived the idea of sending a military attaché to Montenegro. According to the Chief of the General Staff, the unrest in neighboring Albania, which still belonged to the Turks, necessitated such a step. Until the post could be formally erected, Conrad additionally asked that an officer be stationed temporarily in Cetinje.57 The General Staff had in fact been trying to secure an attaché in Montenegro since the Bosnian annexation crisis, when it was felt that the foreign ministry had provided information of military interest late if at all.58 59 Aeh- renthal believed, however, that the needs of the military had been met sufficiently in 1909 when he stationed a general, Baron Wladimir Giesl, as envoy at the court of Nikita of Montenegro. From the army’s perspective, his duties as a diplomat consumed too much of his energy, leaving him little time for military matters. According to one contemporary, his presence in Cetinje changed little and left, as the only reliable source of information, the non-commissioned officer of the reserves who daily drove from Cattaro to Cetinje to pick up the mail.55 Tired of Conrad’s challenges to the foreign minister, the emperor showed scant sympathy for his arguments. Eleven days after rejecting an attaché for Stockholm, he gruffly did the same for Cetinje.60 Six months later, Conrad’s „continuous attacks“ on the foreign minister, on the levels of both policy and bureaucracy, led to his dismissal.61 The temporary disappearance of General Conrad from the scene did not alter the priorities which he had fixed during five years in office. Nor did the methods in pursuit of those ends change drastically either. In early February 1912, with the foreign minister gravely ill and increasingly unable to perform the duties of his office, Blasius Schemua, Conrad’s successor, again raised the question of a military attaché for Montenegro. Like Comad, he called attention to the disturbances in Albania, but unlike his predecessor exhibited more subtlety in trying to make the project attractive to the Ballhausplatz. In particular there was an appeal to the broader political prestige of the Monarchy in Cetinje, especially vis-á-vis the resident Rus55 KA, KM Präs. 1911, 47-32/1: Conrad to the war ministry, April 26, 1911. See also Wanner, Gerhard: Die Bedeutung der k .u. k. Gesandtschaft und des Militärattachements in Stockholm filr die Beziehungen zwischen Schweden und Österreich-Ungarn während des Ersten Weltkrieges. Osnabrück: Biblio, 1983 (Studien zur Militärgeschichte, Militärwissenschaft und Konfliktforschung 29), p. 34. 56 KA, KM Präs. 1911, 47-32/1: Bolffas to the war ministry, May 14, 1911,. 57 Ibidem: Conrad to the war ministry, May 13, 1911. 58 Hubka - Allmayer-Beck: Österreichisch-ungarische Militärattaches und Militärbevollmächtigte, p. 17. 59 Ibidem. 60 KA, KM Präs. 1911, 47-37/1: General Baron Arthur Bolfras to the war ministry, May 25, 1911. 61 In their interview on November 15, 1911, the emperor told Conrad: „Ich sage gleich: die fortwährenden Angriffe gegen Ährenthal, diese Nadelstiche verbiete ich.“ Conrad: Aus meiner Dienstzeit. Vol. 2, p. 282. 53
