Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 46. (1998)

GODSEY, William D. Jr.: Officers vs. Diplomats: Bureaucracy and Foreign Policy in Austria-Hungary 1906–1914

William D. Godsey

Gustav Kálnoky (1881-1895). Even Count Julius Andrássy (1871-1879) wore the uniform of the Hungarian Honvéd. But neither he nor Kálnoky may realistically be considered military figures called upon by the emperor to oversee foreign policy. Originally a career officer, Kálnoky had early opted for diplomacy, though he maintained a connection to the army and periodically received promotions equivalent to his civilian rank." Under Francis Joseph , the Ballhausplatz sent few officers to fill prestigious ambassadorial positions. One general, Baron Ferdinand Langenau, served as envoy in Russia throughout the Andrássy years. The lesser Balkan missions, especially those in Belgrade, Cetinje, and to a lesser extent, Athens, were more often headed by officers, understandably enough given the unrest that accompanied the independence movements in the area. From 1879 to 1895, the legation in Montenegro was run continuously by General-Staff officers, first Baron Gustav Thoemmel, and then Theodor von Millinkovic. Thoemmel later served as envoy in Persia (1887-1889) and Serbia (1889-1895). Two other emissaries who combined diplomatic and military rank, Count Victor Dubsky and Prince Nikolaus Wrede, successively oversaw between 1877 and 1883 the legation in Greece.6 7 By 1896, the year after Kálnoky’s retirement, all but Dubsky among the mission chiefs with military credentials had retired.

When Aehrenthal succeeded to the foreign ministry in 1906, no officers remained as envoys. Like his predecessor, he showed little inclination to introduce a significant military element into the diplomatic corps. His increasingly bitter conflict with the Chief of the General Staff, General Baron Franz Conrad, doubtlessly reinforced his unwillingness on that point. At the same time, the geopolitical importance of the Balkan states recommended sending representatives familiar with military matters. After the conclusion of the Bosnian annexation crisis and the consequent rise in tensions south of the Monarchy’s border, Aehrenthal revived the old custom slightly by posting Major-General Baron Wladimir Giesl as Austria-Hungary’s minister in Montenegro. Giesl’s long experience as a military attaché and military plenipotentiary in various Balkan states, including Turkey, Bulgaria, Greece and Montenegro, made him an attractive addition to the corps in a critical period. He spent four years (1909-1913) at the court of Nikita of Montenegro before Berchtold transferred him to Belgrade where he delivered the famous ultimatum in July 1914. Giesl’s change in career may have had less to do with his own merits, however praiseworthy, than with the patronage of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand. In his memoirs, Giesl hints strongly that his transfer was promoted by the archduke, who had taken considerable interest in him.8 At the same time that he recruited Giesl, Aehrenthal also enlisted

6 For Kálnoky, see Rutkowski, Ernst R.: Gustav Graf Kálnoky. Eine Biographische Skizze. In: Mitteilungen des österreichischen Staatsarchivs 14 (1961), p. 330-343.

7 For a few other isolated examples, see Allmayer-Beck, Johann Christoph: Die Archive der k. u. k. Militärbevollmächtigten und Militär-Adjoints im Kriegsarchiv Wien. In: Österreich und Europa. Festgabe für Hugo Hantsch zum 70. Geburtstag. Graz-Wien-Köln: Styria, 1965, p. 351-378.

8 For examples of the archduke’s favor toward Giesl, see Giesl, Baron Wladimir: Zwei Jahrzehnte im nahen Orient. Aufzeichnungen des Generals der Kavallerie Baron Wladimir Giesl, ed. Ritter von Steinitz. Berlin: Verlag für Kulturpolitik, 1927, p. 210, 235.

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