Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 42. (1992)

BISCHOF, Günter: The Anglo-American Powers and Austrian Neutrality, 1953–1955

The Anglo-American Powers and Austrian Neutrality 1953-1955

stro-Soviet bilateral contacts of 1952/1953 finally bore fruit in the changed international environment of 195568).

But what did the Western powers think of these dramatic bilateral Au- stro-Soviet contacts, which they watched from the sidelines? Washington and London had been frustrated by their loss of the initiative; now they were frozen out of what appeared to be the decisive round in the Austrian Treaty diplomacy. After all, the treaty had first been drafted in Washington and the Anglo-American powers had been the strongest advocates of signing it as early as 1947.

To the British Foreign Office it appeared as if the Ballhausplatz was chasing yet another Soviet hare and in the process threatening Western negotiating positions on the Treaty. Whitehall feared that the Austrians on their own were „in an appallingly vulnerable situation vis-ä-vis the Bussians“69). The Foreign Office considered the Austrians „no match“ in bilateral diplomacy with the Soviets; the British found it unfortunate that Chancellor Raab was „unwilling to recognise his limitations and rather fancies himself at bilateral diplomacy“70). The Western Department in the Foreign Office expressed the main worry when noting that the Soviet initiative on Austria represented just another „facet of the campaign to prevent the entry into force of the Paris Agreements.“ Moscow’s „prime objective“ was

to tempt the Western Powers into Four Power talks on a subject on which some hope of agreement is held out, but, once there, to raise the German question thus causing delay and confusion in the Western camp71).

London feared that the Kremlin Trying to use the Austrian issue as a final attempt to block the ratification of the Paris Agreements. Harrison on the Austrian desk also argued that a virtual Austrian commitment to „military neutralization“ did not correspond with the Ame68) Bischof Austria and Moscow’s Wiles.

69) Record of conversation Harrison with the Austrian Amabassador Schwarzenberg, 8 March 1955, PRO, FO 371/117786/RR 1071/33. Harrison assured Schwarzenberg that all three Western powers were suspicious of bilateral Austro-Soviet talks. He added that they did not feel „that the Austrians might do a deal behind our backs; On the contrary we believed that they had always been very scrupulous about keeping us uninformed.“ When Harrison „took stock“ a few weeks later he noted „it is tempting to refuse to chase yet another Russian hare,“ Harrison memorandum „Austria, 23 March 1955, PRO, FO 371/117787/RR 1071/72.

70) Harrison memorandum for Nutting, 18 March 1955, PRO, FO 371/117786/RR 1071/43. Moreover, Schwarzenberg in London was „new to all this and at present a little out of his depth.“

71) Wright minute, 15 March 1955, PRO, FO 371/117786/RR 1071/34.

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