Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 42. (1992)
BISCHOF, Günter: The Anglo-American Powers and Austrian Neutrality, 1953–1955
The Anglo-American Powers and Austrian Neutrality 1953-1955 effect59). When it became clear that the Paris Agreements would be ratified in Bonn and Paris and that the Federal Republic would be fully integrated into NATO, the Kremlin had to start rethinking its policy after a major diplomatic defeat. In the meantime Raab continued his policy of not aggravating the Soviets in Sunday speeches, in spite of a Soviet propaganda campaign in Austria about the dangers of a new Anschluss. Raab maintained regular contact with the Soviet Ambassador Ilyichev60). At the end of 1954, Raab repeated the basic Austrian position to the Russian: His [Raab’s] Government would be ready to negotiate what, when and where it might be possible; some kind of declaration of neutrality would not be excluded from their thinking, nor would a staged withdrawal [of occupation troops]; but the hard fact, which no verbiage could hide, was that Austria demanded the removal of all foreign troops within a set period61). Raab had related this conversation to Geoffrey Wallinger, the British ambassador in Vienna, and added that the Russians probably would be „böse“ over the next few weeks, because they were so „fear-ridden over the prospect of West-German re-armament.“ But after a time they would get used to the new situation created by the Paris Agreements „and then they might become more negotiable“62). Raab, in short, counseled patience, the best of diplomatic virtues. IV. Raab was right. Six weeks later, on February 8, 1955, Molotov gave his lengthy keynote address before the Supreme Soviet. He announced that he saw no reason „for any further delay in concluding a state treaty with Austria,“ she undertook „not to join any coalitions or military alliances“63). Over the next six weeks the Austrian Ambassador Bischoff in Moscow was busy like never before probing the the exact meaning of 59) Kurth Cronin Great Power Politics 136-42. 60) For Austria in 1954, see Rauchensteiner Die Zwei 228-58. 61) Wallinger to Harrison, 31 December 1954, PRO, FO 371/117779/R 1017/1 [R means that Austria was now in the Southern Department of the Foreign Office]. The Foreign Office observed that it appeared that the Austrians were now intensifying their pressure in the Allied Council and with the Russians to end the occupation, Stow minute, 6 January 1955, ibid.. 62) Ibid. 63) Stourzh Staatsvertrag 131-32; Kurth Cronin Great Power Politics 145-47; Ma- stny Kremlin Politics 41—12. 383
