Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 42. (1992)
BISCHOF, Günter: The Anglo-American Powers and Austrian Neutrality, 1953–1955
Günter Bischof his long-time strategic experience in the European theatre-stipulated that if Austria became neutral, it would have to be an armed neutrality45). In January 1954, before Dulles went to Berlin, Eisenhower cautioned him in the oft-quoted breakfast conference: ... he could see no objection to the neutralization of Austria if this did not carry with it the demilitarization. If Austria could achieve a status somewhat comparable to Switzerland, this would be quite satisfactory from a military standpoint46). Eisenhower shared the views of the Pentagon that a military vacuum in Austria after the retreat of the occupation forces was unacceptable47). The Western powers, incidentally, had already refused to sign an Austrian Treaty in 1948 for similar reasons. They would not pull back their troops from Austria as long as the Austrian Government had not established sufficient security forces to quell domestic disturbances and to resist border incursions by foreign powers48). This, incidentally, is also a good example of Eisenhower’s „hidden hand“ style of leadership49). The President allowed Dulles to rant and rave against the principle of neutrality in public; behind the scenes, however, cases such as Austria’s were studied on their own merit. Who made the decisions? Eisenhower did!50) Eisenhower’s view-with his basic proviso that any future Austrian neutrality would have to be armed-seems to have ended months of discus45) On Eisenhower’s illustrious career see the 2 volumes (1982, 1984) of Ambrose’s biography. 46) Memorandum of Breakfast Conference with the President, 20 January 1954, Folder Meetings with the President 1954 (4), Box 1, White House Memoranda Series, John Foster Dulles Papers, Princeton University. The first scholars to spot this important document have been Gerald Stourzh Die Furche (19 April 1985) 6-7, and Orgins of Austrian Neutrality in Neutrality, ed. by Leonhard 45; Kurth Cronin Great Power Politics 154; Rathkolb Von der Besatzung zur Neutralität in Bevormundete Nation, ed. by Bischof/ Leidenfrost 593-94. 47) The rearmament of Austria, of course, had been discussed before in the American military, see Rauchensteiner Die Zwei 218-220. Rauchensteiner is correct in arguing that the Americans „eine Neutralität Österreichs nur unter der Voraussetzung einer starken militärischen Komponente zuzugestehen bereit waren und daß für die Amerikaner die Neutralität nur mit der Aufrüstung Österrichs stand und fiel,“ ibid. 218. 48) Günter Bischof ’Prag liegt westlich von Wien’: Internationale Krisen im Jahre 1948 und ihr Einfluss auf Österreich in Bevormundete Nation, ed. by Bischof/Leiden- frost 322-24. 49) Fred I Greenstein The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader (New York 1982); Günter Bischof Before the Break: The Eisenhower-McCarthy Relationship, 1952-195) Master’s Thesis (University of New Orleans 1980). 50) Richard H. Immerman Eisenhower and Dulles: Who Made the Decisions? in Political Psychology 1 (1979) 21-38; and Ambrose Eisenhower II 442-4-6. 380
