Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 42. (1992)
BISCHOF, Günter: The Anglo-American Powers and Austrian Neutrality, 1953–1955
Günter Bischof Gruber quickly came around to Raab’s new policy. In June 1953, Foreign Minister Gruber contacted the Indians and asked them to probe with Molotov, whether it would be „useful if Austria were to give an undertaking of neutrality.“ Molotov answered that „it would be useful but not enough.“ The Soviet Foreign Minister added: „Declarations can be given today but withdrawn tomorrow.“ For Molotov, it appears, Austrian neutrality was not yet a feasible option in mid-195321). The Austrian Parliament, however, backed Raab’s and Gruber’s policy of bilateral intitatives with Moscow. On September 23, Gruber proclaimed that Austria’s policy was to be „Frei von militärischen Blöcken“22). Gruber in 1953 warmed up to the concept of neutrality, which he had termed „ausgehöhlt“ in 1946; air power and nuclear weapons rendered the principle of neutrality „sinnlos,“ Gruber had said then23). Politics, for Gruber was clearly the art of the possible: for had not further proliferation of nuclear weapons and air power, according to Gruber’s reasoning, rendered neutrality in 1953 much more a fossil of the past than in 1946? But Gruber did not have the foreign policy Field to himself any longer. Contrary to the practise of his predecessor Figl, who left the field of diplomacy largely to Gruber, Chancellor Raab, despite his inexperience, assumed much more powers in foreign affairs. This trend continued after Raab fired Gruber, packing him off to Washington after the unpre- dicatable Tyrolean had published his „memoirs“ while in office24). This episode inspired Caccia, the British ambassador in Vienna, to comment: „Gruber is not like the elephant for his hide alone“25). In Moscow, Bi- schoff tried to capitalize on Gruber’s departure from the Ballhausplatz telling Molotov that with Gruber’s dismissal, Raab hoped „mit der Sowjet-Union jene guten Beziehungen herzustellen, welche zutiefst den ständigen Interessen Österreichs entsprechen“26). In other words, by 1953, Gruber, Austria’s quintessential pro-Western politician of the post21) On Molotov-Menon conversation, see Bischoff to Foreign Ministry, 1 July 1953, in Österreich und die Grossmächte, ed. by Schilcher 176-77; see also Stourzh Staatsvertrag 86-88; Kurth Cronin Great Power Politics 126. 22) Cited in Stourzh Staatsvertrag 89-90. 23) See Gruber’s speech of 28 March 1946, repr. in Eva-Marie Csáky Der Weg zu Freiheit und Neutralität: Dokumentation zur österreichischen Außenpolitik 1945-1955 (Vienna 1980) 62-64. 24) Steiner Außenpolitik Julius Raabs in Raab, ed by Brusatti/Heindl 215-16; Rauchensteiner Die Zwei 222—23. 25) Letter Caccia to Harrison, 21 October 1953, PRO, FO 371/103750/CA 1022/2. 26) Cited in Stourzh Staatsvertrag 115, and Steiner Außenpolitik Julius Raabs 217. Bischoff, who became Raab’s close and influential confidante in 1953, had been a stern critic of Gruber’s exceeedingly pro-Western policy in the early 1950’s. 374
