Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 42. (1992)
NAUTZ, Jürgen: Österreichische Überlegungen zur wirtschaftlichen Integration Europas und zum europäischen Machtgleichgewicht. Die wirtschaftspolitischen Arbeiten Richard Schüllers im amerikanischen Exil 1943–1950
Jürgen Nautz cipal argument is that the elasticities of demand for exports and imports are insufficient and that, therefore, the balance of payments problems is not curable by changes in prices or exchange rates 4 5). It is possible to offer here only a few observations on this question. For one thing, experience has shown that balances of trade often change rapidly, and currently we see great changes occurring from year to year. England’s balance of payments deficit was 630 million pounds in 1947 and only about 150 million in 1948. And England has raised her volume of exports to 50 percent above the 1938 level 3). The advocates of control will say that England was able to diminish the deficit only by imposing drastic restrictions on imports and by promoting exports. But how could exports be raised so quickly if demand for Britisch goods was inelastic? Also, the increase is the more remarkable since it has been achieved in the face of an artificial rate of the pound and the heavy burden of administrative complications on British exporters. Belgium and Switzerland imposed few controls on economic activity and had still better results. Belgium was able to give England a credit of 74 million pounds, and to grant credits also to other countries, and the Belgian franc has become a “hard” currently, which restricts both exports and employment. Proponents of controls assert that the European countries might achieve balance of their total trade, but not of their trade with the United States, and would therefore still have a large dollar deficit. There is no doubt that the shortage of dollars is largely a reflection of the exceptionally great need for real resources, though that does not explain the dollar shortage of countries like Sweden, Argentina, and Brazil, which did not suffer war damage. At present, European countries still need American aid, but nobody can know whether they will be able to balance their accounts with the United States in 1952. Statistical forecasts for some years ahead are pure guesswork; moreover, European countries estimates of their balances are evidently influenced by the fact that the larger their prospective deficits the larger the amount of Marshall Plan aid they can get. And it is not surprising 4) The different views are fairly in: Foreign Economic Policy for the Unitét States, ed. by Seymour E. ffarris (Cambridge 1948). Harris, Hansen, Samuelson and Balogh assume that the elasticity of demand is insufficient. Gutt and Triffin hold the middle of the road, and Haherler holds the opposite view. Elsewhere he states it as follows: “I rule out as unrealistic the possibility that elasticities of demands for imports and exports may be such as to prevent equilibration” (op. cit., p. 514). 5) Although, in 1944, the London Economist considered such an increase quite improbable, my article “Great Britain’s Trade Policy”, in: Social research, vo. 11, no. 3 (September 1944), expressed the belief that such an increase in exports would be achieved. 366
