Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 42. (1992)

BLACK, Jeremy: British policy towards Austria, 1780–1793

BRITISH POLICY TOWARDS AUSTRIA, 1780-93

schemes was to be hinted21). The following month Stormont wrote of his support for an Austro-Russian defensive alliance and his opposition to mediation, ‘Such an alliance would be the corner-stone of that system, which every friend to this country, and the general interests

of Europe, must wish to see restored___The King never can suffer

the intervention of any power between him and his rebellious subjects in America. This is a principle of justice, dignity, and sound policy from which His Majesty can never depart22).’ Now at war with the United Provinces, the British government had no compunction in suggesting that Austria seek to reopen the Scheldt, Stormont writing, ‘This is a very general wish in this country; At Berlin it might savour of that partiality to the House of Austria, of which we there stand accused, a partiality I shall never disown, as it is approved by my reason, and consistent with every wish I can form for the prosperity of Great Britain ... Our present position with the United Provinces fully authorizes our concurrence in any project for opening the Scheldt; which at another time we could not have done consistently with the faith of Treaties23).’

Stormont hoped that Austria could and would dispel hostile French and Prussian influences in Russia and in early 1781 Austria was the centre of the British government’s aspira-tions24). However, Austria sought better relations with Russia, but not in order to help Britain, whom she did not want to see back in control of her American colonies. Keith did not raise the idea of an alliance because he was convinced that Austria would not desert France for Britain. Kaunitz rejected the idea of opening the Scheldt25). Stormont continued to press the idea of Austria counteracting Prussian influence in St. Petersburg, but when an alliance between Austria and Russia was negotiated neither power informed Britain26). Frederick II had feared an Anglo-Austro-Russian triple alliance27), but by mid-September he was aware that the British prong of an alliance was missing, while Stormont was justly concerned about Joseph’s atti21) Stormont to Keith, 12 Dec. 1780: PRO London State Papers 80/223.

22) Stormont to Keith, 9, 12 Jan. 1781: PRO London FO 7/1.

23) Stormont to Keith, 20 Jan., 4 Feb. 1781: PRO London FO 7/1.

24) Stormont to Keith, 6, 13, 27 Feb., 6, 30 Mar. 1781: PRO London FO 7/1.

25) Keith to Stormont, 7,28 Feb. 1781: PRO Lon don FO 7/1; Joseph II, Leopold II und Kaunitz. Ihr Briefivechsel ed. Adolf Beer (Wien 1873) 81-2; S. Bindoff The Scheldt Question to 1839 (London 1945) 158—9.

26) Stormont to Keith, 27 Feb., 30 Mar. 1781: PRO London FO 7/1.

27) Riedesel, Prussian envoy in Vienna to Frederick, 21 July, Frederick to Count Fink- kenstein, 30 July, Frederick to Riedesel, 21 Aug. 1781 -.Politische CorrespondenzFriedrichs des Grossen 46 (Berlin 1939) 75-6, 117.

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