Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 37. (1984)
ORDE, Anne: France and the Genoa Conference of 1922
338 Anne Orde part and the Russians a part, and the French group could exercise decisive influence by siding with one or the other59). The interministerial committee reported on 8 March. It was not, they said, in Europe’s interest that a belief should spread that recovery could be achieved at a stroke. Such an illusion diverted peoples from the hard work which alone could create wealth. Similarly it was an illusion that the recovery of central and eastern Europe could altogether cure the crisis in the west: the settlement of reparations and the restoration of the devastated regions were of much more pressing importance for France and the economic balance of the continent. Of the situation in Russia, to which rather more than half the report was devoted, the two essential features were that the country was shattered and that it already owed the west large sums of money. The debts could not be cancelled, as a matter of principle, even though payment would not be possible for many years. In any case cancellation would not greatly help Russia, and it would aggravate the difficulties of the creditor countries. Russia must be restored in accordance with her own interests; so she should not be allowed to import on credit more than she needed for purposes of reconstruction, nor to export resources which she needed herself. This would be in France’s interest too, for she did not have much to export and previous investors would benefit most from the recovery of Russian production. On the other hand France must take account of Britain’s needs and so must not be too rigid on Soviet imports and exports unless she wanted a serious conflict with Britain. As far as credits were concerned the Russians would ask for, but must not be allowed, complete control of any that were granted. Credits given by exporting countries for the supply of goods would not really help Russia: the only genuine solution was a rational restoration of Russian production. The idea of special regions was expounded. They ought to be accessible areas where reconstruction would make a quick impact. Eight zones were suggested, ranging from the White Sea and Arctic Sea area to the Urals, and providing industry, raw materials, and agriculture. The Caucasus raised the political problem of Georgia, which France wished to support; but doing so would make a settlement of the oil question impossible. On trade in general the committee advised that the principle of the Soviet monopoly of foreign trade need not prevent trade relations with foreigners. The latter must have the right to own goods, travel, make contracts, and so on, but would not have any fiscal privileges. These conditions should be enough to enable trade to start again, but it was likely to be small at first. The restoration of agriculture was vital; and peasants must be given the right to dispose of their produce and be supplied with goods and credit. France could supply some equipment and veterinary advice. There might be some agricultural concessions. Former property must be restored. Long-term concessions were envisaged, based on stable legislation with guarantees of secure operation. If Moscow’s right to speak for Georgia were accepted, chartered companies could be organised for the Caucasus and other zones, but the Russians were unlikely to agree to grant monopolies, and the repayment of loans could be achieved by the Soviet government taxing the oil companies and paying their creditors out of the proceeds. As for the consortium, France could not ignore it and should participate to prevent it from doing harm, as for example by taking over former foreign property. The section of the report on central Europe said that since questions concerning the peace treaties and reparations were excluded from the Genoa agenda, the commission had not studied the recovery of the ex-enemy countries. It observed that the measures being considered by other bodies (the League and the Austrian Section of the Reparation Commission) to promote the financial recovery of Austria were inspired by considerations similar to those referred to for the other countries of the region, most of which were suffering from budget deficits, depreciating exchanges, low purchasing power and general disequilibrium. They must make vigorous efforts to reform and conclude understandings with their neighbours. 59) Memorandum by Maréchal, 3 March; “Projet Krassin”, 4 March; memorandum by Seydoux, 4 March 1922: ibid. 107.
