Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 37. (1984)
ORDE, Anne: France and the Genoa Conference of 1922
330 Anne Orde dealt with by that body; but he dismissed the fear that he wanted the Genoa conference to be some kind of permanent institution21). Among the functions of the League of Nations could be included the question of disarmament. This was a matter on which the French were extremely sensitive, and they feared that Lloyd George intended to push it. At Cannes he bowed to Briand’s objection to including armaments on the agenda of the economic conference, but he made it plain that one of the results he intended to follow from a settlement in eastern Europe and from the proposed Anglo-French pact was a reduction in land armaments and a limitation on French submarines22). Poincaré therefore told Lloyd George at Boulogne that he would not agree to any discussion of disarmament at Genoa: any discussion there might be was a matter for the League. Lloyd George agreed that French and British armaments could not be called in question, but he clearly hoped to be able to use the non-aggression undertaking to press for reductions in the armaments of east European countries23). The other major political question was the de jure recognition of the Soviet government. Poincaré tried to reopen the question of Soviet advance acceptance of the Cannes conditions, and to get an assurance that the Allies would only act together. He then sought British agreement that recognition would not be given until the Russians had given proof of sincerity and were carrying out any undertakings they might give at Genoa. Lloyd George refused to go beyond Beneä’s suggestion that the decision on recognition should depend on the results of the conference24). He himself was in favour of recognition and believed that the Russians would agree to almost any terms, even though Krasin had told him that they would not accept the Cannes conditions; but the Cabinet had not discussed the matter since Christmas, and Lloyd George’s preference for leaving things open was reinforced by considerations concerning his own government25). However while Poincaré was urging Allied solidarity and stiff conditions, the French were receiving Soviet approaches, and rumours of Franco-Soviet agreements abounded. The Soviet initiatives were directed at breaking the capitalist front: all the major powers were approached individually; and to stimulate each, hints and rumours were spread about agreements being reached with others. Soviet negotiations with Germany led to the near completion of two agreements before the opening of the Genoa conference26). The French were less receptive. 21) DBFP 1/19 no. 29, 31, 34. 22) DBFP 1/19 no. 3, 19; Orde Great Britain and International Security 16-19. 2S) DBFP 1/19 no. 34. 24) DBFP 1/19 no. 28, 30, 31, 34; Poincaré to Saint-Aulaire, 9 February 1922: MAE Europe 1918-40, Russie 349. 25) Latest Cabinet discussion, meeting of 16 December 1921: PRO CAB 23/27, C 93 (21). 26) On German-Soviet economic relations see Günter Rosenfeld Sowjetrußland und Deutschland 1917-1922 (Berlin 1960); Horst G. Linke Deutsch-sowjetische Beziehungen bis Rapallo (Köln 1970); Werner Beitel - Jürgen Nötzold Deutsch- sowjetische Wirtschaftsbeziehungen in der Zeit der Weimarer Republik (Baden 1979). A
