Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 37. (1984)
ORDE, Anne: France and the Genoa Conference of 1922
328 Anne Orde In addition to the fear about reparations there was great suspicion about the inclusion of Soviet Russia in the conference. French middle-class opinion was still imbued with the image of Soviet Russia as a source of revolutionary menace to French society (symbolised by a famous poster of the 1919 election campaign, of a ferocious Russian peasant with a knife between his teeth), which had betrayed France by withdrawing from the war, and had robbed Frenchmen of their property* 10). Few public men or economic organisations had yet come out in favour of resuming even trade relations: the pressures active in Britain in favour of such a course hardly existed in France. Lloyd George, in conversation with Briand in London, made much of a statement by Millerand in the summer of 1920 that France would recognise the Soviet government when it accepted the obligations of its predecessors11); but although Briand said that the atmosphere was more favourable than in 1920, the French government had laid down, as recently as 8 November, as the conditions necessary for resuming official relations, Soviet recognition of all Tsarist debts, respect for private property, adoption of a representative system of government, and abandonment of Bolshevik propaganda and revolutionary enterprise: in sum, “1’ abandon sincére et complet des expériences tentées et du systéme appliqué jusqu’ici et le respect des principes et des régies morales adoptés par tous les peuples civilisés”12). While Briand was in London Millerand sent him a warning that any recognition of the Soviet government, even disguised or indirect, would be an error and a danger13). At Cannes Briand tried to exclude any mention of recognition from the resolution on the economic conference: having failed in that, he secured the alteration of a positive statement that the Allies would be prepared to grant recognition on the basis of Soviet acceptance of the conditions, into the more negative version that recognition would only be given if the Soviet government accepted the conditions14). But Millerand considered that the resolution was insufficiently firm on Russia; and Briand failed to secure specific mention of the conditions in the invitation to the conference addressed to the Soviet government15). In effect the Cannes decisions expressed Lloyd George’s wish to leave things as open as possible for the sake of getting Soviet representatives to come to Genoa. The Soviet acceptance of the invitation made no mention of the conditions16); and vier 1922. For Briand’s policy and the background to his resignation see Jacques Bariéty Les Relations franco-allemandes aprés la premiere guerre mondiale (Paris 1977) 86—90; Marc Trachtenberg Reparation in World Politics (New York 1980) 219-236. 10) For the French perception of Soviet Russia and the conference plan see Renate Bournazel Rapallo, naissance d’un mythe (Paris 1974) 76-111, 118-124. For the poster see Edouard Bonnef ous Histoire politique de la troisiéme république 3 (Paris 1959) 66. For French investments and property in Russia see below p. 334—336. ") DBFP 1/15 no. 109; 1/8 (1958) no. 29. 1!) DBFP 1/20 (1976) no. 443. 13) Millerand to Briand, 21 December 1921: MAE Europe 1918-40, Russie 348. u) DBFP 1/19 no. 3, 5, 6. 15) Bournazel Rapallo 49; DBFP 1/19 no. 15, 19. 16) DBFP 1/19 no. 14 appendix.
