Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 36. (1983)
COONS, Ronald E.: Reflections of a Josephinist. Two Addenda to count Franz Hartig's „Genesis der Revolution in Österreich im Jahre 1848”
214 Ronald E. Coons that there was a connection between these events and that Kolowrat had conspired to bring them about. Both in a lengthy footnote published in the third edition of the Genesis and in a letter to Metternich written in November 1850 he implied, without naming him directly, that Kolowrat had deliberately failed to provide for adequate public security prior to the opening of the Lower Austrian diet in the hope of ridding himself of his beleaguered rival35 *). Hartig was not alone in his suspicions. They were shared by Princess Melanie Metternich, who anticipated them in an entry written in her diary while in Moravia with her husband during their flight from Vienna: „Mon mari faisait tenir tous les jours des conférences chez TArchiduc Louis. Je crois que c’est á la conférence du 12 [mars] qu’il a insisté pour que les différentes autorités gouvernementales se concertassent á l’effet de prendre les mesures nécessaires pour assurer la sécurité publique. Chez nous, la question se com- plique de difficultés particuliéres, par lesquelles on entrave tout. C’est ainsi, par exemple, qu’il y a dans Vienne des autorités bien différentes, dönt dépend la sécurité publique: le conseil municipal, le bourgmestre, le gouvernement de la province, la chancellerie aulique, la direction de la police, l’autorité militaire, etc., etc., et tout cela empéche l’action du pouvoir, Taffaiblit au lieu de la fortifier. ... Le comte de Kolowrat avait été chargé de présider la conférence ayant pour objet de régler cette question et d’établir Tentente entre toutes les autorités compétentes. Toutefois, on a eu sóin d’en écarter Clément“ 38). If Hartig and Princess Metternich are to be believed, Kolowrat was the sorcerer’s apprentice of the Viennese revolution who allowed demonstrations to occur on March 13 and then proved unable to stop them once they had done his work for him. This argument, which has been accepted by so eminent a scholar as Heinrich Ritter von Srbik 37), may be comforting to Metternich’s admirers. It is, however, based primarily upon circumstantial evidence and is in any case irrelevant. In the first place, there is no documentary proof that Kolowrat actively used his position as de facto minister of the interior to prevent adequate precautionary measures from being taken for the morning of March 13. To the contrary, there is every reason to believe that those officials directly responsible for public security were convinced that they had taken measures appropriate to the disturbances they expected to occur38). In the second place, the case against Kolowrat is 35) Hartig Genesis 126; Metternich—Hartig 67. See also Schiitter Aus Österreichs Vormärz 4 36—37. 38) Mémoires laissés par le prince de Metternich 7 (1883) 541. 87) Srbik Metternich 2 261—265 and 271—272. 38) The precautionary measures taken by the authorities in preparation for the morning of March 13 are discussed in Heinrich Reschauer Das Jahr 1848. Geschichte der Wiener Revolution 1 (Wien 1872) 162—166 on the basis of an official report on the deliberations concerning public security held on March 12. According to Reschauer 166: „Aus diesem Bericht geht unzweideutig hervor, daß sämmtliche Kommissionstheilnehmer auf nahende Ereignisse gefaßt, aber nicht des ganzen Ernstes derselben sich bewußt waren. Sie trafen Vorsichtsmaß-
