Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 35. (1982)
WILSON, Keith: Isolating the Isolator. Cartwright, Grey and the seduction of Austria-Hungary 1908–1912
184 Keith Wilson tablished that nothing can be brought about in that part of Europe without Germany’s consent. As a matter of fact, the position of Germany at Constantinople is more brilliant in appearance than in reality. It is founded upon the personal friendship between the Sultan and the Kaiser, and not upon real benefits which this friendship secures to the Porte or to the Turks themselves, for the Kaiser’s pretension to be, as it were, the protector of Mahommedan interests is a somewhat bombastic one. The accidental death of the Sultan or the conclusion of a genuine understanding between Russia and Austria would entirely alter the situation. Among other impediments which lie in the way of bringing about the gradual withdrawal of Austria-Hungary from German control is the traditional enmity which is supposed to exist between the ideas of the radical party in England and the reputed ambitions of Austria-Hungary in the Balkans. Austrian public opinion has not yet forgotten Mr. Gladstone’s ‘hands off’ cry against Austria, and Germany will not be slow to remind Austrians of it. In reality, neither liberal nor conservative governments in England have now any intention of opposing legitimate Austrian aspirations in the Near East, and the first duty of a new English policy should be to reassure Austrian public men upon this point, for Germany’s exertions in Vienna are concentrated on making Austria believe that England is at heart hostile to her and would sell her interests to Russia to curry favour at St Petersburg. Is it not possible to convince Austrian public men of the error of this idea? It seems to me that it would be worth while to make an effort to do so, because, with patience, it is not impossible to make people understand even the error of their views. Another cause which holds Austria dependent on Germany is the former’s fear of Italy, which may be summed up in the two phrases: the Triestine nightmare and Italy’s supposed ambitions in Albania. Germany has so far succeeded in making Austrian public opinion believe that but for the Triple Alliance Austria would be in continual danger from Italy. This danger, it is thought in Vienna, is minimized by the influence of Germany at Rome. What is, however, the true situation in respect of this matter? Italy has no real desire to possess Trieste, which, by its geographical position, can never become an outlet for Italian trade, but she dreads that that port should fall into the hands of Germany, or fall so completely under German influence as to render it for practical purposes a German harbour on the Mediterranean. The more dependent Austria’s foreign policy is on Berlin the greater does the Triestine danger become for Italy. The creation of a strong and really independent but non-maritime Austria would probably solve the Triestine question. What makes Italian public feeling nervous with regard to Albania is the fear that should it at present pass into Austrian hands it would really mean an increase of Teutonic influence along the Adriatic, and therefore increase the Teutonic danger for Italy. Should Austria, however, emancipate herself from the tutelage of Berlin, this danger becomes less for Italy. Perhaps some day the neutralization of Albania as an independent Principality, and the construction of cross-railways from the Danube to the Adriatic, asked for by Italian commercial circles, might contribute very much to pacify the anxieties of Italian public opinion. Among the more enlightened Italian public men the belief is very general that Italy and Austria could perfectly well come to terms without the intervention of Germany, but the moment a real rapprochement is imminent between the two former countries, Germany begins to create difficulties and the Berlin Foreign Office pretends to be alone able to hold back Italy from carrying out her nefarious design of attacking Austria. The effect of this belief in Austria is to keep her, out of timidity, under the subjection of Berlin, but it ought not to be very difficult to point out to Austrian statesmen that after all, if a crisis were to arise with regard to Trieste, it would be the influence of King Edward at Rome rather than that of the Kaiser which would effectively restrain the Italian government from attempting to carry their ambitions too far. There are minor difficulties which would have to be overcome before Italy and Austria could be brought closer together than they are by the official ties of the Triple Alliance. There is always that open wound, which seems so trifling, and which is yet so
