Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 35. (1982)
WILSON, Keith: Isolating the Isolator. Cartwright, Grey and the seduction of Austria-Hungary 1908–1912
180 Keith Wilson notamment ä Algeciras’55); in London it was believed that neither Italy nor Austria was strong enough to serve as a real drag on German policy. As Crowe put it, in connection with Austrian dreadnoughts: ‘in view of the existence of the triple alliance, it cannot be overlooked that austria may, whether she likes it or not, find herself engaged in a war against us’56). This, of course, applied all the more to the bonds of the Dual Alliance. London never shared Cartwright’s confidence that there could be such a thing as ‘an alliance between equals’, and always preferred the version of Talleyrand, Palmerston and Bismarck to the effect that there could only be horse and rider. Germany’s intervention in the Bosnia affair early in 1909 only confirmed this preference, pointing as it did to the unlikelihood of Austrian emancipation from German leading strings, despite the strength of Cartwright’s language57); whilst Austria herself was never really forgiven for disturbing that sacred cow, the status quo, in the first place. None of these explanations sufficiently accounts for the blind eye turned in the direction of Cartwright’s policies, any more than does the one that it was because Grey felt then, as he said later, that Austria-Hungary was ‘a star that may dissolve’58). What really determined British policy was fear of reverting to the state of Anglo-Russian relations that had characterised recent years, and to the state of British isolation that it was felt that that would be enough to produce. In October 1906 the French Ambassador in London had found Hardinge most anxious to keep in being the Triple Alliance: ‘ si eile prenait fin, nous verrions l’Empereur Guillaume travailler par tous les moyens ä la réconstitution de l’alliance des trois Empereurs’59 60). The Permanent Under-Secretary was again much exercised on this score in the spring of 1909 ®°). The Dreikaiserbund was the ‘misfortune’ that was believed would result from the denunciation of the Triple Alliance by one of its members or from the attempted application of Cartwright’s ideas. Of all diplomatic arrangements, it was the Dreikaiserbund that the British least wanted to see, for it was feared that it would, as in the past, free Russia from Balkan or European concerns and allow her to resume the imperial struggle with Great Britain which the latter’s conclusion of the Anglo-Russian Conventions was an admission that she couldn’t hope to win. If the energies of Russia were removed from the Balkans it would be to Central Asia primarily that they would be removed. The British did not identify themselves so thoroughly with St Petersburg as they identified Vienna with Berlin, but so afraid were ss) See footnote 47. 56) BD 6 no. 178: Minute by Crowe 3 May 1909. 57) As reported by St. Aulaire (see footnote 47): ‘Aehrenthal se fiche de Berlin’. 58) PRO FO 800/371 (Camock MSS): Minute by Grey on Russell to Nicolson 21 November 1913. 59) DDF 2' Série 10 (1948) no. 241: P. Cambon to Bourgeois 24 October 1906. 60) Hardinge MSS vol. 18: Hardinge to the King 31 March 1909; BD 6 266: Minute by Hardinge 20 April 1909; PRO FO 371/683/11613: Minute by Hardinge 24 April 1909.
