Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 34. (1981)
BRIDGE, Francis Roy: Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire in the Twentieth Century
Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman empire 259 vinces128). This did not augur well for Austria-Hungary’s chances of participating in the military reforms the Germans were planning in Turkey. Certainly the Austrians, who had no desire to see an early partition of what remained of the Ottoman empire, approved in principle when they learned in April 1913 of German plans to send a military mission to reform the Ottoman army. At Conrad’s suggestion, Berchtold asked the ambassadors at Constantinople and Berlin whether they would favour Austro-Hungarian participation129). They were enthusiastic130): such a mission would not only give Austria-Hungary some influence in the Ottoman army, clearly destined to be the dominant force in the new Turkey; it would also be a useful addition to the Monarchy’s inadequate information services in the Ottoman empire, as well as providing opportunities for trade. Although after the Second Balkan War Conrad began to argue131) for an independent approach to Turkey — in view of the ‘Haltung Deutschlands in ähnlichen Fragen’ and ‘die seit neuester Zeit uns vielfach schädigende Orientpolitik dieses Staates’ - Berchtold had already sounded the German government. In fact, Wilhelm II was strongly opposed to Austro-Hungarian participation: ‘Das sei unsere Domäne, von der Österreich seine Hände besser wegließe’132). Until the end of September, therefore, the Germans fobbed Vienna off with evasive replies before announcing detailed plans which hardly admitted of modifications to suit the Austrians. The Turks, too, still smarting from the Adrianople affair, gave Vienna no encouragement whatever132“). Berchtold and Pallavicini still hoped that Austro-Hungarian officers might be allowed to serve in one particular field, say, the cavalry133). But the Germans raised technical objections, and Conrad was certainly not keen to see Austrians serving under a German command. When, by December, the Entente Powers had begun to make a fuss anyway, Pallavicini, with the full support of the military at- taché, Pomiankowski, pointed out that Austro-Hungarian participation would only excite France and Russia even more; and when the emperor himself endorsed this view the whole idea was finally abandoned134). The incident was only one of an entire series that illustrated the differences between German and Austro-Hungarian policies towards the Ottoman em128) PA XII 206: Pallavicini to Berchtold, No. 48 G, 21 August 1913. 129) PA XII 464: Conrad to Berchtold, Res. Gstb 2558, 9 June 1913; Berchtold to Szögyény and Pallavicini, Nos 2839, 2840, 16 June 1913. i3°) pa xil 464: Szögyény to Berchtold, No. 23, 3 July 1913; Pallavicini to Berchtold, No. 38 D, 11 July 1913. 131) PA XII 464: Conrad to Berchtold, Res. Gstb 3379, 13 August 1913. 132) Löding Balkanpolitik 234. 132 a) pA xii 464: Berchtold to Pallavicini, No. 4364, 15 September 1913 and Löwenthal to Berchtold, No. 66 E, 5 November 1913. 133) PA XII 464: Löwenthal to Berchtold, No. 66F, 5 November 1913. 134) PA XII 464: extract from Pallavicini to Berchtold, No. 77 G, 8 December 1913 and minute by the emperor; Berchtold to Pallavicini, telegram 2, 2 January 1914. 17*
