Borvendég Zsuzsanna: Fabulous Spy Games. How international trade networks with the West developed after 1945 - A Magyarságkutató Intézet Kiadványai 24. (Budapest, 2021)
‘THE HUNGARIAN MAFIA’ - A Cold War Hungaricum
'THE HUNGARIAN MAFIA' intermediary trade built to support communist party companies: they spotted tremendous opportunities in scaling up re-exporting, and exploited this with such skill that the members of the foreign trade lobby that formed by the 1960s (who harnessed the potential in their West German relationships to extend their influence) effectively became the frontrunners of the Bloc even in the eyes of the capitalist West. The next level in broadening the opportunities of intermediary trade was to establish joint ventures. We do not know who was the first to come up with the idea to authorise joint ventures and when, but we have information from as early as 1960 that János Nyerges and János Fekete were considering the idea of setting up a joint western enterprise to engage in transit trade. Fekete “conducted negotiations with Deutsche Bank and the West German representative of a French bank in Vienna. It was the latter who told him that the finance minister, Comrade Rezső Nyers had rejected the idea. I [i.e. János Nyerges] responded to him that if we could broker a deal along commercial lines, I would have the opportunity to put this forward again in spite of the financial position.”241 This sentence suggests that Rezső Nyers, the father of the new economic mechanism, challenged the interests of the foreign trade lobby. This chasm adds further nuance to opinions on the causes of the failure of the economic reform. The processes initiated in 1968 were also aimed at decentralising the operations of industrial companies. However, cutting back centralisation brought increased power to the leaders of the trusts established during the 1960s. The interests of the industrial corporate lobby often conflicted with those of the representatives of foreign trade companies: the ‘impexes’ established after the nationalisation of international trade were granted monopolies to trade in the international markets, rendering both the distribution of finished goods and the purchase of raw materials their privilege. This meant manufacturing companies generally had no say in making the deals and in bargaining the terms of the contracts, and, consequently, had no insight into how the profit was used. Following the introduction of the economic reforms in 1968, the leaders of industrial facilities attempted to exert 241 ÁBTL 3.1.5 0-12344/13, p. 142-143 Report by‘ Dóczi’ 21 March 1960 89
