Borvendég Zsuzsanna: Fabulous Spy Games. How international trade networks with the West developed after 1945 - A Magyarságkutató Intézet Kiadványai 24. (Budapest, 2021)
‘THE HUNGARIAN MAFIA’ - A Cold War Hungaricum
'THE HUNGARIAN MAFIA' the fact that “their character did not match the profile of Hungarian exports (American automotive parts, for example)”.235 Not unlike previous cases, profits were to come from the fact that the Hungarian partner had preferential treatment in the market of the South American country. In this case, however, it was not merely a simple re-exporting transaction, but forging documents. Arató and Fekete argued in favour of accepting the deal on the grounds that their culpability could not be proven if the deal was exposed, as the fraud would be committed by the German trader alone. No written agreement or contract would be drawn up, so it would be impossible to prove that the Hungarian party was aware of anything and that they even benefited from it. In the end, the Hungarian partner refused the proposal after the officials of the Ministry of Foreign Trade who were concerned about Hungary’s reputation eventually won the argument, predicting a degree of ethical damage in the event of exposure that was not commensurate with the potential profit.236 Several sources have survived regarding the re-exportation of coffee and cocoa. Hungary purchased considerable quantities of both products from Brazil, but the vast majority of the goods did not end up with Hungarian consumers. In 1959, for example, the country imported coffee from the Amazonia region for 3.5 million dollars, but less than one million dollars’ worth of goods were actually sold in Hungary.237 235 ÁBTL 3.1.2 M-25447, p. 132 Note for Comrade Mádai, 6 January 1956 236 ÁBTL 3.1.2. M-25447, p. 133 Note, no date indicated. 237 ÁBTL 3.1.2. M-14967 p. 306 Statement by emigrated Hungarian trade attaché György Lázár in the 30 April 1960 issue of the daily O Estado de Sâo Paulo. Although the American source does not mention this, previous research shows that the Hungarian foreign trade elite built a considerable corruption network in Western Europe, which probably also contributed to the fact that certain western firms were ready to use Hungarian companies as intermediaries even when they could have purchased the goods themselves. Keeping business relations alive and safeguarding their share in the Hungarian market were obviously important aspects to consider, and, bearing in mind the Iranian oil transiting mechanism we have mentioned several times already, we can also assume that the Hungarian party was willing to sell the goods below the 85
