Levéltári Közlemények, 48–49. (1978)

Levéltári Közlemények, 48–49. (1978) - FORRÁSKÖZLÉS - Vida István: Iratok a Nagy Ferenc vezette magyar kormányküldöttség 1946. évi amerikai látogatásának történetéhez / 245–281. o.

Iratok a magyar kormányküldöttség 1946. évi amerikai látogatásának történetéhez 271 The Secretary said that he had made the proposal with regard to the Italian—Yugoslav border that the line should be left to the Deputies

2 and that consideration should be given first on an ethnic basis and secondly on an economical one. The Prime Minister said that if the same decision would be handed down now to Hungary as after 1919, it would mean upheaval of their political system. The Secretary said that the he realized that these questions could not be decided with any degree of perfection. He said that in Europe it was simply impossible with these lines to do what he suggested - to have a line which is truly on an ethnic basis. NA. Dept. of State, Decimal File, 86451/6-1246. - Közölve: FR., 1946. VI., 306-308. old. 1 Lásd: FR., 1946. II. к. A Külügyminiszterek Tanácsa 1946. május 7-i délelőtti ülésének jegyzőkönyve. 2

Külügyminiszter-helyettesek értekezlete. A kialakult gyakorlat szerint a Külügyminiszterek Tanácsa a vitás kérdéseket a külügyminiszter-helyettesek értekezlete elé tárta azzal, hogy ott dolgozzák ki a jóváhagyandó megállapodás szövegét. 20. Washington, 1946. június 12. Leslie G. Tihanynak, a Külügyminisztérium Európai, Közel-Keleti és Afrikai Hírszerzés Osztálya munkatársának memoranduma Gyöngyösi János külügyminiszter, Szegedy-Maszák Aladár washingtoni magyar követ és Marik Pál követségi tanácsos, valamint John D. Hickerson, az. amerikai Külügyminisztérium Európai Ügyek Osztálya és W. Barbour, a Délkelet-Európái Ügyek Alosztálya helyettes vezetőinek megbeszéléséről. Participants: Foreign Minister Gyöngyösi; Minister to the US, Szegedy-Maszák; Counselor of Legation, Marik; Mr. Hickerson of EUR; Mr. Barbour of SE; Mr. Tihany of EAI. Parti The Foreign Minister began his remarks by giving a brief summary of the political and economic situation in Hungary substantially as follows: For some time to come the political situation has been determined by the fact that at the end of the war Hungary was liberated by the Red Army. The population of Hungary is overwhelmingly pro-Western in its sympathies. The pro-Western elements, who amount to about sixty percent of the population, and which include the extremely individualistic peasantry, are anxious to preserve a middle-class form of living in Hungary. In this desire they are opposed by a minority consisting mostly of industrial workers, who are pro-Eastern in their sympathies and are not interested in the continuation of a middle-class Hungary. As a result of this split in Hungarian public opinion, the affairs of the country could be entrusted only to a coalition government. The elections held in November 1945 showed the will of the people in returning a majority of pro-Western bourgeois-minded elements. It is obvious that the Left cannot obtain a parliamentary majority through constitutional means in Hungary today. Nevertheless, the dynamic nature of the labor movement and the support that they are in a position to receive from the army of occupation might give them the upper hand in a political contest between the two opposing factions. Owing to the desperate économie situation of Hungary, a crisis appears to be imminent. Such a crisis could be utilized by the Left to achieve its political objectives. The present crisis is due to certain economic factors. These factors arise from the Armistice Agreement of January 20, 1945 which imposed exceptionally heavy economic obligations on Hungary. These economic obligations consist of reparations ($ 300,000.000) and restitution of property removed from the territory of the United Nations during the war. To these two factors one must add the impoverishment of Hungarian economy resulting from the removal of goods from Hungarian territory by the retreating German armies, and certain of the pre-war financial obligations of the Hungarian Government, especially toward the West. In addition to these economic burdens,