Levéltári Közlemények, 39. (1968)

Levéltári Közlemények, 39. (1968) 1. - FORRÁSKÖZLÉS - Karsai Elek: Brit diplomáciai iratok az 1921. évi húsvéti királypuccs történetéhez / 105–139. o.

132 Karsai Elek to Paris and obtained from M. Briand the above-mentioned answer. I am much disposed to believe that this version is correct. It is very noteworthy that His Majesty's Minister in Vienna was already in possession of information in the same sense (see his telegram No. 17 of the Ist instant). In the second place, whilst from the outset I reported to your Lordship that the visit of Charles was carried out without any invitation from or complicity of persons in Hungary — much less the Government — practically all foreign Governments, especially those of the „Little Entente", and all the representatives of_ the press jumped at the opposite conclusion, and without waiting to examine into the truth, adhered to their view and took action accordingly, even when their representatives here had reported in a contrary sense. Whilst demanding that the ex-King should leave the country immediately, the Czech and Serbiaii Governments took steps to prevent his return to Switzerland, the Serbians began to mass troops on the frontier, the Austrian Government h ampered and delayed Mr. Lindley's action in preparing for the journey through Austria, and military measures were adopted in Czecho-Slovakia and Roumania. All these things went far towards preventing the attainment of the very object that was aimed at, namely, the departure of King Charles, which the Hungárián Government were bent on from the very beginning. Nothing I venture to submit, could have been more correct than the attitűdé of the Governor. Admiral Horthy, the Prime Minister and the Government as a whole, and above all of the Chamber who unanimously approved of their action. But the repeated threats and representations which began to rain down from the „Little Entente" began to arouse a not unnatural feeling of provocation and Opposition, which might easily have lead to a change of front on the part of the Hungárián people had Charles's departure been delayed, not out of love for the Hapsburg, but of irritation at what they consistently consider unjust interference is their internal affairs. The Serbian, Roumanian and Czech Governments are all parties to the League of Nations, and article 17 of that Covenant provides for the eventuality of a dispute between members of the League and States which are not members, laying down a procedure which shall prevent a recourse to hostilities. No thought was given to this procedure, but preparation was made on all sides for military action. I am not clear as to the method in which the League habitually takes action, but a perusal of the Statutes seems to show that the initiative is taken by the Council. In the absence of any movement by them, and in the conviction that the chief desire and interest of His Majesty's Government in this part of the world is the maintenance of peace, I venture to suggest that the Great Powers should take such steps as may be possible to prevent military activity by the members of the „Little Entente" except as mandatories of the Conference of Ambassadors. I remain strongly of this opinion both in the interest of peace and in justice to the country to which I am accredited. If the Hungárián Government infringe the treaty or act improperly, it becomes necessary to use force; but if they behave correctly, as in the present case, precipitate action is to be deprecated, as it seems to me, most strongly. Again I see Statements in the press to the effect that the Czech Government are intending to demand guarantees against a repetition of such an incident. As facts have proved the accuracy of my original Statement that there was no collusion with any persons or parties within this country, and that the incident was due solely to a coup de tété on the part of ex-King, it is obviously impossible that the Hungárián Government can give such guarantees, whilst their conduct when confronted with the unexpected has been absolutely correct and has given no ground whatever for complaint. I will next pass to the interesting lesson which has been given by this episode as to the depth' of royalist feeling in this country. I must preface this subject by stating that excepting a very small number of Communists — an infinitesimal minorty of the whole population — there is a universal and exceedingly strong desire for a King. In a recent conversation with some of the „Little Entente" representatives, M. Milojevitch in particular dwelt very strongly on this, describing how his own country could not exist as a republic, that his sentiments were royalist to the extreme, and how in this respect the Hungarians had all his personal sympathy: he observed how desirable it would be were an English Prince to be placed on the throne. I said that I personally fully shared his feelings, but that with regard to an English Prince, His Majesty's Government had already pronounced against this idea, but if he and his colleagues had such strong views on the need for a King in Hungary, as they expressed, why did they not lay their views before their Governments in the hope of arriving at some Solution

! With regard to the individuality of the ex-King Charles, it cannot be denied that his