Levéltári Közlemények, 32. (1961)

Levéltári Közlemények, 32. (1961) - FORRÁSKÖZLÉS - Karsai Elek: Iratok a Gömbös-Hitler találkozó (1933. június 17–18.) történetéhez / 147–199. o.

Irat

ok a Gömbös—Hitler találko

zó (1933." június 17—18.) történetéhez 191 Ducic ezenkívül megemlítette még, hogy a budapesti csehszlovák követtől nyert értesülése szerint sem a Kormányzó úr, sem a külügyminiszter, sem pedig Mussolini a berlini útról előzetesen informálva nem voltak. A miniszterelnök ezen téves híreket megfelelően rektifikálta. Végül Duöic, — szokása szerint, — kiemelte a szerb nép barátságát a magyar nép iránt és utóbbinak kiváló tulajdonságait magasztalva, közölte a miniszterelnök úrral, hogy Sándor király nagyon szeretne vele megismerkedni és bármikor rendelkezésére áll. Géppel írt másolat. — OL. Küm. pol. 1933—21 j7—1825 (ad 1900). Az irat tetején lilabélyegzős szöveg: ,,Lásd eredetit : külön." 26. Róma, 1933. június 30. A római német követ jelentése a birodalmi Külügyminisztériumnak a Hitler—Gömbös találkozó ügyében kialakult olasz álláspontról. 5885/E431074— 76 The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry Rome, June 30, 1933' I 1089 Received July 3. П Ts. 798 Political report v Subject: Alleged Hungarian démarche with Mussolini on the question of re vision. Italian views on Gömbös'visit to Berlin. Hungary characterizes the question of revision as not being especially urgent. Gömbös'journey to Berlin is viewed here with calm. With reference to your instruction H Ts. 602 of May 27. So far it has not been possible to obtain particulars about the letter, mentioned in telegram 102 of May 10, from the Hungarian Minister President to Mussolini about the Hungarian demands for revision. Both at the Foreign Ministry and at the Hungarian Legation here, where inquiries were made, people knew, or pretended to know, nothing. It was significant that both in Italian and especially in authoritative Hungarian quarters apparently special importance was attached to making the Hungarian revisionist demands appear as not at all urgent. In particular it was emphasized in Hungarian quarters that at present there were more important things for Hungary than the question of revision, which was by no means ripe for a solution and which had better be left alone for the moment. Hungary was more interested in the early attainment of concrete aims, ^specially the recognition of her equality of rights, for which the Quadripartite Pact, if properly applied, was clearing the path. As far as the Pact itself was concerned, it was by no means being rejected in Hungary, as frequently asserted. To be sure, here and there, especially in Legitimist circles, it was said that the Pact, after the various modifications which it underwent, had become meaningless, but this view was not shared by the Government. Viewed in terms of political realism the Pact offered various advantages compared with the present situation; but above all, through the initiative of Mussolini, a source of tension had been removed at a critical moment, which could have endangered European peace. Similar ideas, by the way, can be found in an interview published on the 27th of this month in the Popolo dTtalia, which the Hungarian Foreign Minister granted to a representative of this paper at about the same time the conversation outlined above took place. The visit of Minister President Gömbös in Berlin at first annoyed people here, especially since the Government was informed of it only at the eleventh hour and at first could not form a clear picture with respect to the meaning of the journey. But after an explanation by the Hungarian Minister*» they quickly calmed down and approved of the visit as'an entirely welcome establihment of contact between the leading statesmen. Even though they do not seem completely clear as to the real cause of the visit, they see nothing to make Italy uneasy in a conversation on economic questions concerning