Külügyi Szemle - A Teleki László Intézet Külpolitikai Tanulmányok Központja folyóirata - 2002 (1. évfolyam)
2002 / 2. szám - RÉSUMÉ - Valki László: Recognition of States as a Political Weapon - The Lessons of the Dissolution of Yugoslavia
Résumé László Valki: Recognition of States as a Political Weapon - The Lessons of the Dissolution of Yugoslavia The question of recognizing - and if yes, under what conditions - of the successor states of the dissolving Yugoslavia seemed to a be a very important question for the member states of the European Union and the U.S. in 1990 and 1991. They believed that they would be able to stop the process or, at least, to influence it by granting or denying recognition. A great of number of people only remember that unified Germany was a bit too fast in recognizing the member states which were about to leave the federal state and thus Germany itself actually contributed to the pace of dissolution and even to the outbreak of the armed conflict. However, we now know that the "policy of recognition" played only a minor role in the events. As regards the Germans, it is true that de jure they did the first steps, but de facto the recognition of the successor states had already happened months before. It happened precisely at the time when the foreign ministers of the EU agreed as early as August 1991 that they would not recognize those border changes within Yugoslavia which did not come about peacefully and upon agreement, and then at the time when the Security Council declared in September 1991 that borders could not be modified by using force. So when Germany recognized Croatia and Slovenia in December, the issue was not recognition any more, but where the borders between the newly independent Yugoslav member states would be drawn. 208 Külügyi Szemle
