Külpolitika - A Magyar Külügyi Intézet elméleti-politikai folyóirata - 1984 (11. évfolyam)
1984 / 5. szám - A tanulmányok orosz és angol nyelvű tartalmi kivonata
László J. Kiss: Western alliance policy and East-West détente: the foreign and security policy of the Federal Republic of Germany (1954- 1984) 1955 produced a decisive turn of events in post-Second World ^Far developments. Once the Paris agreements were ratified West Germany became a sovereign state in the terms of international law as part of the western alliance and, the two German states having become integrated into their respective system of alliances, the process of the institutionalization of the two blocks was completpd. , Right from its foundation the Federal Republic was embedded in the svmetric and asymetric texture of the international web. Sovereignity and its own foreign policy interests could only appear as part of the western integration. The basic Paris agreements not only ensured sovereign rights but also confirmed the limitation on those of the western powers. What Bonn obtained was equality rather than independence. The priority of western integration and an anti-Com- munism which in many respects served as an ersat% for identity with its own system, turned into the raison d’etat of the Federal Republic of Germany. What was decisive for Bonn was the degree to which the modification of US defence doctrines or the disarmament plans of the fifties would affect the value of a Bundeswehr integrated with NATO, and, consequently, the say of West Germany within the western alliance and the status of the two German states. It became obvious from the end of the fifties that a conjunction between a western solution of the German question and disarmament could not be maintained. The gradualerosion of US military superiority and the end of its geopolitical invulnerability led to a situation where the issue of a Soviet-American world-wide limi-_ tation on armaments and the German Question parted company. Washington accorded priority to agreement with Moscow over Adenauer’s anti-status quo policy. Adenauer tried to give the German Question a European, rather than an Atlantic aspect by closer cooperation with France. But Bonn was as unable to harmonize de Gaulle’s independent status quo policy with the interests of reunification, as with the change in US priorities. Adenauer’s complimentarity between an Atlantic policy and the kind of Eroupe that Paris stood for came to an end. Bonn was isolated within its own alliance. From the early sixties Bonn’s Ostpolitik, a lengthy process of integration, attempted to coordinate the long-term interests of reunification, an Atlantic and a European policy that had separated since the Cold War, integrating them as part of a dynamic European policy which - within western strategy - would include elements of Ostpolitik and western policy, as well as of political and military detente. The treaties which resulted from the Ostpolitik turned out to be a sort of second foundation of the state following the Paris treaties. The recognition of the status quo in Europe was at the same time self- recognition on the part of Bonn. Normalizing relations with the countries of Eastern Europe meant the normalization of the foreign policy of the Federal Republic. Early in the seventies the priority accorded to economics in international affaris, and the relative lessening weight of the US produced new responsibilities and duties for Bonn which had not been sought. Bonn’s economic power and the policy of détente made it possible to reduce earlier dependence, but new kinds of dependence became unavoidable. The Federal Republic became a stabilizing element within the Western alliance but at the same time also a source of conflicts. From the middle seventies the revaluation of American global strategy led to a situation where Bonn was less able to integrate American policy with its own foreign policy. It proved difficult to reconcile economic and foreign policy targets (the nuclear energy agreement with Brazil, the gas pipeline deal et c.) The open rejection of détente by Reagan made the premisses on which West German foreign .policy was based questionable. The unity between western alliance policy and East-West détente fell apart. Borin then attempted to act as a sort of interpreter between the two super-powers. This however made Washington suspect efforts towards .neutrality and a revival of the Rapallo spirit, while as far as Moscow was concerned, Bonn turned out to be the accomplice of the US in the policy of putting Cruise missiles in operational locations. This objectively led to a growing importance of the EEC and Franco- German cooperation as far as Bonn was concerned, but its. basic foreign policy di- lemna remained unchanged: how could the interests of western security and alliance policy be reconciled with East-West detente. This indeed is, and forever will be, the criterion by which the effectiveness and reliability of Bonn’s foreign policy will be judged. VI
