Külpolitika - A Magyar Külügyi Intézet elméleti-politikai folyóirata - 1982 (9. évfolyam)

1982 / 1. szám - KÖNYVEKRŐL - Fülöp Mihály: Fransois Mitterand: Itt és most. Beszélgetések Guy Claisse-szel

The UN Charter still has an important role in interstate relations and is of defining importance for international law. And yet it cannot be interpreted as a final and rigid code governing the behaviour of states. Amendments which, properly adhering to basic principles, make it possible to solve new and special problems must be supported. These include doing away with the remnants of the colonial system, disarmament, the preservation of peace, economic cooperation without discrimination, environmental protection and other world wide problems.

The UN and its charter exemplify the ability to satisfy the requirements of a changing world. One may justifiably presume that the political will of the member states will make it possible for complex political, economic, social and other activities to be extended. The realisation of such .processes will be effectively and flexibly aidecfby the intruments which the UN Charter'contains.

Ferenc Gazdag—-László J. Kiss:

Franco—West German relations in the seventies

Franco—West German relations had a decisive role in the taking shape of the West European integration, which in turn influences the relationship between the two countries, as well as structural developments within the western alliance. Views often differed on the policy of integration but in the Giscard—Schmidt era the two Leaders were able to survey the situation free of ancient phobias.

Early in the sixties France still had a pioneering role in Ostpolitik and détente, which was gradually taken over by West Germany. Security and cooperation in Europe depended largely on steps taken by the latter country. France and West Germany being in step in their policy of détente made it possible for a joint western strategy to take shape.

The early eighties see changes not only in French domestic policy but also in the international framework of Franco—West German cooperation. Objective conditions for cooperation between the two countries continue, however, and subjective differences between their domestic policies cannot basically revalue their relations.

Péter Rajcsányi:

US defence policy in the eighties

The increased role of the armed forces and efforts to establish military superiority are the most important aspects of US foreign policy for the eighties. Reagan’s foreign policy, aimed at creating the “appropriate strength”, considers the redefinition of Soviet—-American relations as of primary importance. An

attempt to prepare for an important trial of strength is part of this policy.

The article surveys American defence policy under the Carter administration. Military measures taken, and developments in the doctrine of the balance of terror are examined in detail. Measures were designed to develop strategic nuclear forces, as well as reinforcing US and NATO troops stationed in Europe and forming and strengthening forces to be used in other areas. Carter harmonized the defence programme with undertakings given by the US. More active US foreign policy meant—as against the Nixon era—undertaking more duties and, in a division of labour with its allies—greater American participation and military efforts.

The Reagan administration basically relies on the doctrine of a “real threat” but the line to be followed is subject to disputes within the competent circles.

In conclusion the article discusses the US position on military détente. Though the US subjects arms limitation to whatever are the objectives of military development at the time, they are nevertheless interested in a disarmament agreement with the Soviet Union.

András Keres^ty:

Getting one’s bearings in the Middle East

According to the author the killing of Sadat was the first serious international crisis for the Reagan administration. The death of an ally could be compared to the overthrow of the Shah, though, there was no revolution.

They very likely do not even put the basic question to themselves in Washington. That is: can one continue to steer by the star of Pax Americana? After all, as the Arab consensus has it, Americans are guided only by their interests as a great power and everything else plays a subordinate role.

True enough Mubarak did the state some service in Sadat’s time, carrying out many an important foreign policy mission. He was always kept informed on the state of negotiations with Israel, but he was nevertheless not committed to Sadat’s initiative.

The Middle East continues to be a dis- quietening trouble spot. It influences international relations, and a possible turn for the better might well favourably influence relations—of high priority—between the Soviet Union and the US. One should not forget that the Joint Soviet—US declaration of October ist 1977 held the promise of slow and gradual progress in coming to an arrangement. The Middle East was the first place where the US, linking up with the policy of Sadat’s special mission, upset the aple cart of a shared great power position which had been so difficult to work out.

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