Külpolitika - A Magyar Külügyi Intézet elméleti-politikai folyóirata - 1979 (6. évfolyam)
1979 / 1. szám - KÖNYVEKRŐL - Volle, H.: A belgrádi utótalálkozó
ÁRPÁD PRANDLER 'Landlocked states and the third law of the sea conference At the third law of the sea conference landlocked states showed a common interest in ensuring access to seas and oceans including transit rights necessary to make these effective, as well as in ensuring participation in the exploitation of the biosphere of the exclusive economic zone established by litoral states, bearing in mind that such zones abstract huge areas from the open seas that had been used by everybody until recently; not to mention their right to participate in the exploitation, under as favourable conditions as possible, of the mineral wealth of the sea and ocean bed which, outside the limits of state sovereignty form the common heritage of mankind. Prandler discusses the various positions argued on these points at the 3rd UN Uaw of the Sea Conference, in the context of their regulation in earlier agreements concerning the law of the sea. He examines the draft of the new agreements, the conference’s informal composite negotiating text. He evaluates the advantages and lacunae of the law of the seá agreement in preparation, doing so from the. angle of landlocked states, including Hungary. JÓZSEF BALÁZS On the substance of detente The article endeavours to outline the substance of detente. Detente is tbe term used to denote the fight for the reduction in tension. In other words the policy of detente. This policy and its results, that is the already established, objectified process of détente, cannot be separated. Detente is one of the stages in the implementation in practice of peaceful coexistence. Detente first appears as a concrete international policy and relationship entailed by the basic principle of peaceful coexistence. The relationship of the two contradictory world systems, containing as it does, in an immanent way, the dialectics of confrontation and cooperation, is the decisive, but not the only, terrain of the above. Secondly detente means that, all over the world, Cold War forms of contact are liquidated, and new ones are applied which reflect the altered international power relations. Thirdly detente means that, between countries belonging to the two systems military, political, economic and other tensions must be relaxed and reduced from an explosive level to one that can be put up with and tolerated, in which a relationship leading to agreement is already accorded the decisive role. Forthly detente means that the foundations of the sort of cooperative coexistence between countries belonging to the two systems must be laid which are based on mutual interests and are not directed against anybody. Fifthly detente means that states pursuing such policies do not make claims, implemented in action, to treat contradictions or crises which appear on the level of social systems, by employing instruments deriving from an outside force, under their authority, with the design of changing the given social system, or of hindering changes fed by internal reasons. The implementation of detente means a modus vivendi in which, on the one hand, the adjustment of various interests is realized as an ongoing process, and on the other, in the absence of the above, their coexistence is ensured and direct clashes do not occur. Detente in the optimal sense has not come true yet. The process has only just started. GYÖRGY KOLLÁTH Certain specific features of current Brazilian foreign policy In the ’seventies Brazil has produced spectacular economic results, but the country’s foreign policy has attracted attention as well. Brazil’s foreign policy, often described as responsible pragmatism, has taken shape as the joint effect of changes in the economic background and in the context of home and foreign policy. The exhaustion of the reserves of the earlier economic growth model had helped the present regime into the saddle. Equally the new growth model, based on capital imports and accumulation thanks to the use of brutal instruments of constraint, which is openly exports orientated, with the accelleration of capitalist developments as its aim, induced a more aedve foreign policy, and changes in the line. The world wide recession in the middle ’seventies potentiated the necessity-for foreign trade and foreign policy diversification. Changes in international power relations also play a part. Brazil, by elastically adjusting to the changed strategy of the US and the multinational states, endeavoured to exploit the advantages of a companies tried to the maximum degree. On the other hand the relationship of security, power and the economy was also gradually transvalued. Security no longer referred to outside military threat's, but increasingly to the inner stability of the established system, at the same time the closeness of the relationship between military security and economic potential was increasingly recognised. The Brazilian leadership at the same time attempts to use the growing economic potential in the context of changed international power relations by extending the scope of its manoeuvres, increasingly looking after the special interests of Brazilian large capital, without however calling the dominance of the US into question. As an economic projection of this position the present leadership tries to profit from the great economic potential and relative industrial development compared with the majority of developing countries, exploiting to the maximum the advantages that accrue from unequal development. One of the most spectacular phenomena in this respect is the opening vis á vis developing countries in Africa, V
