Külpolitika - A Magyar Külügyi Intézet elméleti-politikai folyóirata - 1973 (1. évfolyam)
1973 / Próbaszám - A tanulmányok orosz és angol nyelvű tartalmi kivonata
de Gaulle as quick to realize the conflict between the two socialist great powers and was seeking to organize a common European defence against the „yellow peril” by inviting Nikita Khruschov to Paris in 1960. In the changed world situation after Evian (1962), French diplomacy made a radical turn in its policy in relation to China. The recognition of the People’s Republic of China and the taking up of diplomatic relations (1964) were organic parts of the united Asian and European policy and of the „global diplomacy” of de Gaulle. To restore France as a great power it was necessary for the country to loosen her dependence on the US-do- minated NATO. The gradual improvement of Soviet-French relations after the low mark of 1960—62 served to counterbalance this depedence. At the same time Peking became regarded as a potential reserve, an „allied enemy” of France in the manoeuvre against the „two superpowers”, the USA and the USSR. After the political crisis of May 1968, the weakening of the franc and finally the resignation of de Gaulle, France was obliged to give up the General’s plans for a great power role and had to be content, at least temporarily, with the role of mediator between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. The United States accepted Paris as host for the talks on Vietnam. Following France’s advice the Nixon administration also realized that the way out of the Indochinese war could not by-pass Peking. After his resignation in 1969, General De Gaulle was preparing for his visit to Peking, scheduled for the summer of 1971, as the most important Western mediator for Nixon. The closing section of the study gives an analysis of the situation in which" France, after the change-over in the Elysées Palace and as a result of the Brezhnev-Nixon meeting, the „Ost Politik” of the FRG, the talks in Helsinki and Vianna, is turning towards the People’s Republic of China with increased interest. The graudal normalization of relations between the two „superpowers” could offer similar arguments to France and the People’s Republic of China for their policy on disarmament, the non-proliferstion treaty and other issues. Gábor Hidasi: The Reflection of International Political Ambitions of China’s Leadership in the Economic Aid Policy of the People’s Republic of China The writer has tried to give a comprehensive picture of the volume of economic aid and credits extended by the People’s Republic of China between 1953 and 1973 according to individual countries by drawing upon all available data and information. The analysis of the economic aid policy of the People’s Republic of China demonstrates that changes in this policy have been quite regularly following the shifts in the international political objectives and efforts of the Chinese leadership. In fact, changes in the direction, methods and intensity of economic aid policy have preceded, in some cases, avowed shifts in the line of Chinese foreign policy. During the first decade of the existence of the People’s Republic of China when the Chinese leadership was following a policy of cooperation with the USSR and the other socialist countries, China’s economic aid policy basically aimed at increasing the strength, prestige and influence of the socialist camp. During this period, substantial Chinese economic aid with no obligation of repayment was given primarily to the Asian socialist countries bordering on China i. e. the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam which suffered most from im perialist aggression. Towards the end of this period, from 1956 till 1959, however, great power ambitions and hegemonistic tendencies made their first appearance in the orientation and the methods of Chinese economic aid policy. They resulted in the Chines leadership increasingly turning against the countries of the socialist camp and the overwhelming majority of the parties of the international communist movement in the course of the 60’s. At the beginning of the 60’s, the focus of Chinese economic aid policy gradually shifted to the developing countries of Asia and Africa. As the Chinese leaders could not muster much support within the socialist camp and the international communist movement for their VI
