Itt-Ott, 2002 (35. évfolyam, 1/137. szám)
2002 / 1. (137.) szám
way”, then “...Under current NATO rules, Europe would be stuck with a regime that, among other threats, claims the right to speak for Hungarian minorities living in neighboring countries, in direct violation of the commitments Hungary made to join NATO in 1999.” This attack reveals her prejudices and the weakness in her argument. {But} the article is peppered with other instances of inaccuracies, unsubstantiated accusations and insinuations. It is obviously partial toward the current Hungarian government. She has a right to her opinion, and she is certainly not alone in that, but she does not have a right to present distortions and misrepresentations as a factual portrayal of Hungary’s role in the alliance. It is disturbing, that her insinuations and unfair generalizations extend beyond a critique of the previous government and tend to extend a blanket condemnation of Hungary. The issue of governmental promises ought to be examined in relation of the timetable of the entire accession process. Many who were familiar with the issues in NATO Enlargement of 1999 will remember that the negotiations went on for years. For example, I recall using the material released by Foreign Minister László Kovács’ (of the Horn government) office in 1997. It is unlikely, that all the promises and negotiations were made in the last eight months of 1998 (i.e. during the first months of the Orbán Government from May 1998). If I remember correctly, the final votes were taken by the Alliance member states in February of 1999. She seems to attribute positive changes to the current Medgyessy administration. Does she base these on something more than sympathy toward the current Socialist government? Then she ought to substantiate her statement by verifiable facts. “...the evidence is that other new members are already falling behind their commitments. Recently a senior figure in European security remarked that ‘Hungary has won the prize for most disappointing new member of NATO, and against some competition,’ citing the previous Hungarian government’s anti- Semitism, extraterritorial claims against its neighbors, and failure to play a constructive role in Balkan security.” The Hungarian state took a very active role in Bosnia, even before it became a full-fledged member of NATO. (See “Magyarok az IFOR-ban, SFOR-ban”/ Hungarians in the IFOR and SFOR, Zrínyi Publishing, Budapest). It is documented that the Hungarian Corps of Engineers rebuilt over 80 bridges (!!!) in Bosnia making roads and railroads operable again. My son, who served in Bosnia in the SFOR intelligence for about eight months, was very impressed (and told me others were also) by the engineering know-how and speedy efficiency these military construction units demonstrated. Just consult with engineers (as to technical expertise and enormity of financial value), and with economists to approximate the worth in infrastructure provided in such assistance. According to NATO reports Hungary also provided the “staging and logistic and overall support of IFOR/SFOR-forces, FWDs of the Command of USAREUR (Taszár) of the 21. Theatre Support Command (Taszár, then - as of February 1997 - Kaposvár)” (primarily for 25,000 US troops), the airbase at Taszár and Kecskemét in Hungary, provided supplies and security for NATO troops during the various conflicts during the nineties. It established a logistic base at Pécs (city in Southern Hungary) for Swedish, Danish, Norwegian, Finnish and Polish troops. Refer to (http://www.meh.hu/kum/ kumwebhr/NATO/hm_ifor.html) NATO’s report for detailing Hungary’s substantial commitments. Just to sample this report: “Such significant events included the restoration of the bridge over the river Drava connecting Bares and Terezina Pole designated to become the principal main road crossing point for IFOR/ SFOR-forces...” or: “According to registered figures currently at our disposal this has so far meant the movements - that is entry into and exit from Hungarian borders (airspace) of more than 170,000 troops, 4,000 aircraft, 1,200 trains and 70,000 combat and transport vehicles.” One can reasonably infer that in any major NATO operation the weight of undertaking falls on its members unevenly. At the times of the Balkan Wars, perhaps on account of her geographical location Hungary was one carrying a major burden. The listed examples (and these are only a minute part of the list in the report!) seem to fall into the category of substantial achievements. Ms. Wallander must not have consulted any of these reports when she wrote her article. But Hungary’s ability of playing a role in the Balkans should be weighed very carefully. Only those, uninformed or oblivious to this region’s 20th century history, can expect Hungary to ignore the situation of her sizable minorities under the sovereignty of several Balkan states. Most important of these is Serbia, which was the initiator and perhaps the major perpetrator of the unrest and bloodbaths in the Balkans 50 ITT-OTT 35. évf. (2002-2003), 1. (137.) SZÁM
