Itt-Ott, 1986 (19. évfolyam, 1-4. szám)
1986 / 4. szám
But these perspectives were those of the outsiders. How did 19S6 affect the Hungarians themselves - in Hungary, in the neighboring states, and throughout the world? Furthermore, how did their fellow East Europeans respond to their plight? Because, after all, a revolution in Hungary was bound to have an international impact, more so than if the upheaval had taken place in any other East European system, excepting only the USSR. Why? Because, of all the peoples in East Europe, Hungarians were a part of the population of four other states in significant numbers. In Czechoslovakia, there were more than 600,000; in Rumania, over two million; in Yugoslavia, half a million; and close to 200,000 even in the Carpatho-Ruthenian part of the USSR. It was unavoidable that what happened in Budapest would have repercussions in Kolozsvár (Cluß, Újvidék (Novi Sad), Kassa (Kosice) and Ungvar (Uzhgorod). And repercussions there certainly were: particularly in Rumania and Czechoslovakia, and, to a lesser extent, in the USSR. Demonstrations swept the major cities of Transylvania and a significant number of Hungarians crossed the borders to assist their co-nationals in Hungary. Even though the program - in the 16 points enunciated by the students/workers and others in Budapest - did not include any irredentist claims, the neighboring states viewed the Hungarian uprising with apprehension, and their leaders clamored for a speedy Soviet suppression of what they labelled a reviving center of Horthyite nationalism. Khrushchev himself reflects on this in his autobiography when he sasys; Furthermore, if the counterrevolution did succeed and MATO took root in the midst of the Socialist countries, it would pose a serious threat to Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania, not to mention the Soviet Union itself After consulting with the Poles, Malenkov and I flew to Bucharest. In addition to the Rumanian comrades, the representatives of the Czechoslovak Partg led bg Novotng were there and the Bulgarian comrades led bg Zhivkov. All we had to do was explain the state of affairs. We didn't have to convince angone of the need to take decisive action because these comrades had already been thoroughly informed by their ambassadors in Budapest about the situation which was developing there. Furthermore, some of the border regions in Hungary were already starting to seek arms from Czechoslovakia and Rumania in order to defend themselves against the counterrevolutionary government of Imre Nagy. The leaders of the fraternal Socialist countries were unanimous! we had to act, and we had to act swiftly. The Rumanians and the Bulgarians said that they wanted to join us in contributing military aid to the revolutionary workers of Hungary in their struggle against the counterrevolution. We replied that there was no need to involve any troops in this operation other than Soviet troops who were already stationed in Hungary in accordance with the Potsdam agreement. We joked with the Rumanian comrades about how Rumania was now so eager to throw itself into battle against counterrevolution, while in 1919 Rumania had been on the side of the counterrevolution which crushed the Hungarian revolution of Bela Kun. The Rumanian comrades laughed. Then they wished us success and told us to hurry. Not only did the leadership of the neighboring states call for the liquidation of the revolution, they actively supported the intervention in every conceivable way short of declaring war on the Imre Nagy government Here we must remember that the sentiments of the party elite were not necessarily shared by the peoples, the majority of the people in any one of these states. However, the majority peoples were by and large passive witnesses to the crime and they did little — nor could they do a lot — to hinder the Soviets in their grisly task. The accusations of nationalistic manifestations flew hot and heavy particularly in Transylvania and Slovakia. In both areas, travel was restricted, border defenses were bolstered, and foreigners could not travel in the regions inhabited by Hungarians. Systematic efforts were made to isolate the Hungarians from the Slovaks and the Rumanians. The disinformation tactic resorted to in Rumania was to falsify the 16 points of the revolutionaries - to include irredentist slogans which called for the re-annexation of Transylvania to Hungary. As Peter Gosztonyi points out, the only chauvinist manifestations at this time originated in the neighboring states which feared the developments in Hungary. He states: 'When Transylvania's Hungarian population began stirring and _ enlisted the support of a good portion of the Romanian university youth _ the Romanian secret police hit upon a brilliant countermove. With the idea of divide and rule in mind, it had leaflets printed in Magyar, 9
