Hungarian Studies Newsletter, 1975 (3. évfolyam, 6-8. szám)
1975 / 6. szám
DISSERTATIONS* Decsy, Janos. (Columbia U., 1973) “Prime Minister Andrassy and the Franco-Prussian War, 1870-71: A Study ot Hungarian Influence on the Austro-Hungarian Dimplomacy.” 350 pages. Xerox and microfilm order no. 74-17,857.* This study focuses on the role played by Count Julius Andra'ssy (the Elder), as the first Prime Minister of Dualist Hungary, intheforeign policy decisions oftheDual Monarchy on the eve and during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. Particular attention is given to the thought and outlook which guided Andra'ssy’s actions, the means and ways by which he strove for their achievement, and the consequences of both for the development of Austro-Hungarian foreign policy. The basic aim of Andrassy’s foreign policy was to prevent developments which were contrary to the interest of Hungary and that of the Monarchy, Hungary’s bulwark against hostile neighbors. To achieve this, between 1867 and 1870Andrássy realized Hungary’s right to parity in the internal, and decisive influence in the external affairs of the Monarchy. He desired the status quo maintained within and the integrity of the Monarchy, protected without. He wanted Austria to renounce her desire to regain her position in Germany which she lost as a result of the Austro-Prussian War of 1866. Andrassy saw in Russia and the Panslav-inspired Slavic national movements the most dangerous enemy. He, therefore, demanded that the Monarchy shift her attention to the East to contain Russian expansionism. Andrássy regarded an alliance with Bismarckian Germany as the best guarantee against Russian aggressionandtheencroachmentsof the Slavic nationalities in the Balkans. Moreover, Andra'ssy wished to maintain the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire and the political status quo in the Balkans. Andra'ssy’s policy was thus limited in aim and defensive in nature. Foreign Minister Count Friedrich Ferdinand von Beust and the Court Party recognized also the danger that threatened the Monarchy from the East but they accorded primacy to the German question which they hoped to solve in an alliance with France. Andra'ssy, therefore, consistently hindered Beust’s pro-French policy and in 1869 he vetoed the projected Austro-Franco-ltalian alliance against Prussia. By this time, Andra'ssy emerged as the most powerful politician in the Monarchy. He had mass support in Hungary, and his policy corresponded to the ambitions of the Austro-Germans. Moreover, Andra'ssy was guided at all times equally by Magyar and Imperial considerations and this was well-known to King Francis Joseph. When the Franco-Prussian War broke out in July 1870, Beust and the Court Party expected a French victory and were eager to exploit it. Andrássy resisted a war for an Austrian victory might lead to the abolition of the Dual system, or a defeat might result in the collapse of the Monarchy. Unhesitatingly, he demanded a policy of strict neutrality with partial preparedness to place the Monarchy in a state of readiness for all eventualities in the East. If Russia entered the war in favor of Prussia, the premier would have supported an intervention on the French side. It was this position that (*) Most ot the abstracts are based on those published in Dissertation Abstracts International. Microfilm and Xerox copies of the original full dissertations may be obtained from Xerox University Microfilm, 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Ml 48106, when not indicated otherwise. When ordering, use order number given after each entry. Francis Joseph adopted essentially at the crucial meeting of the Common Council of Ministrers of July 18, 1870. Neither Francis Joseph nor Beust and the Court Party could go against Magyar and Austro-German opinion. Andrassy’s opposition was thus one of the major factors that forestalled Austria’s entry into the war. The prevention of the Dual Monarchy’s participation in the war contributed not only to the localization of the war but also significantly to the defeat of France and to the victory of Prussia. The disastrous French defeat and the consequent unification of Germany undertheHohenzollerns ruined Beust’s foreign policy. The failure of Beust was Andrassy’s triumph. Tuleya, Edward A. (American U., 1974) “Federation: Past and Present Aspirations of the Slovaks.” 409 pages. Microfilm and xerox copies will soon become available. For information write to the author, who is Associate Professor of History at Millersville State College, Millersville, PA 17551. How the idea of federation took root with the Slovaks and became a pragmatic goal for the realization of Slovakian national aspirations is the thrust of this study. To accomplish this it was essential to understand the elements and development of Slovak nationalism for it was the driving force behind the aspirations for federation. A substantive problem of research was the handling of Slovak sources made available since World War II. Essentially these sources contradict for the most part information supplied by the Hungarians before, and the Czechs after World War I about the Slovaks and their national aims. Budapest and Prague viewed Slovak nationalism as anathema to their goals of attaining a onenation state. To outside observers they denied the existence of a Slovak nation or even a Slovak problem. When pressed, they called it an internal matter of a low priortiy. Therefore, except for a small segment of the international community, very little is known, even less understood, about the Slovaks and their role in international relations. Nothing as extensive as this study of the Slovaks and federation has appeared in the English language. The author attempts to clarify Slovak aspirations and past relations with the Magyars and Czechs. He feels that only by avoiding the mistakes of the past can the small nations in the Middle Zone be prepared to acknowledge the rights of others and to work for a better future. In the Danube region, federation plans were allowed to surface by the dominant nation during times of crisis. Thus, introduced from a position of weakness rather than strength, federation had little chance for success. Such wasthecase priorto the fall of Czechoslovakia in 1938 when the Czech leadership agreed to a federated status for the Slovaks. It is ironical that before 1938 the Slovaks were not able to attain a true federative status within the framework of what was termed a democratic system. For twenty years the federation promised the Slovaks by the Czechs in the Cleveland (1915) and Pittsburgh (1918) Agreements was disregarded by Prague. Slovak national aspirations came nearer to being realized under totalitarian regimes. In the first instance, the Nazis forced a climate for the acceptance of federation by Prague and, as circumstances dictated, the establishment of the first Slovak independentstate. Underthe threat of being absorbed by Hungary, the Slovak leaders chose what was perhaps the only feasible alternative, independence under German protection. In the second instance, the attainment of federa(Continued on page 7) 18 No. 6, 1975 HUNGARIAN STUDIES NEWSLETTER
