Hungarian Church Press, 1968 (20. évfolyam, 2. szám)
1968-06-01 / 2. szám
HGP Vol XX Special Number - 154 - (07935) 1968 'Po 2 as a first step, the dissolution of the military organizations of the two treaties. The member states of the Warsaw Pact have repeatedly declared their readiness to do this* Then, non-aggression pacts between the member states of the two military bloos, Then a pact under which the European states would renounce the use of force. Then the limitation of armaments in seme fbrm (atom-free zenes, the freezing of the armament levels, etc) 0124) The completion of the Noi>-Proliferation Treaty and its adoption by the European states will certainly facilitate the conclusion of such agreements. f) Problems Related to Disarmament Our expositions so far have presented in "longitudinal section" the outline of disarmament negotiations. What now follows is an attempt to give a "cross section" in the sense of turning our attention to certain problems constantly recurring in relation to the problem of disarmament. In dealing with these problems related to disarmament, we shall try to bear in mind what has crystallized in the course of disarmament negotiations in the way cf basio ideas or practical measures. The ultimate goad is the gradually accomplished and controlled general ard total disarmament. In this connection, special importance diould be attached to the cause of nuclear disarmament# On the basis of experiences, we maintain that what seem to be useful ard probably within reach at an early date are 'the agreements which have the character of disarmament measures or agreements to limit armaments. l) l) The creat^n of the technical conditions cf disarmament - provided the other conditions already exist - cennet cause insuperable difficulties. The problem concerning the technological conditions of controlling nuclear armaments is more difficult. In the course cf the disarmament negotiations, the question cf control has proved again and again the greatest obstacle and most stubborn problem. It is a fact that, in many of the stages cf the negotiations, the technical questions have given rise to serious debates. However, it seems that the key problem, after all, is not the one concerning the technological problems of control. In the final analysis, the basic problems in the background have concerned certain principles (have the control measures a primary or a secondary significance as compared with the actual disarmament measures?), questions and reservations concerning security, differences of opinion as to the choice of the controlling organ, etc. - that is to say, matters which lie outside the circle of purely technological problems. Having taken all these matte® into consideration, we mast arrive at the conclusion that what wc said above in general about technological conditions must have its special application.on the technological aspects of controls; at the present level of technological development there cannot be really any insurmountable obstacles or insoluble problemsa12 5)