1987. Különkiadvány, 1987.10.01 / HU_BFL_XIV_47_2
organitat ion's proportional ahare of candidatea on the national liet vould be concluded througb tbe PPF.- At leaat one PPF candidate vould run in each election diatrict. More tban one PPF candidate per election diatrict could run bút vould nőt be mandatory. Tbie vould be varranted vben tbe local voluntary public organirationa are competing vitb one another to get tbeir candidate elected to the National Aaaembly. The PPF vould decide vhich candidatea to enter on the liet, vithout the votera' approval beforehand.- A neceaeary and aufficient condition fór entering on tbe liat independent candidatea nőt aponaored by the PPF could be the collection of a apecified niunber of aignature8. The votera giving their signaturea vould nőt have to reeide or vork in the same election diatrict. When the PPF nominationa have cloaed, the independent candidate himaelf vould decide in vhich election diatrict he vante to run.- The inatitution of nomination meetinga vould become auperfluoua. Bút every candidate on the liat vould have to be enaured equal opportunity to hold election ralliea.- The fact that the aame PPF vhich aponaore the official candidatea alao has control over organizing and managing the electiona violatea the principle of equal opportunity fór all candidatea. It aeems expedient to give the courte juriadiction over election procedurea. The courte vould inveatigate alao complainta of irregularity in the electiona.- The proposed modifications vould eliminate the confuaing contradictiona of the 1983 Electoral Lav. The nominating meeting is a relic from a period vhen the candidacy of a single nominee had to be approved, by acélaim. It is unsuitable fór entering competing candidatea on a fair liat; a roomfull of people cannot decide vho should be a candidate. Thue the abolition of the nominating meeting vould clearly be a step in the right direction. Ve propoae the expanaion of the national Üst ae a compromise solution. On tbe one hand, it vould guarantee fór the party leaderahip that the party's candidatea get elected to the National Aaaembly, and vould thereby reduce —bút vould nőt, and should nőt, automatically exclude—the likelihood of the party's being voted dovn. On the other hand, it vould pave the vay tovard a pluralistic structure of the National Assembly. The deputies elected on the national Üst vould be repreaenting the organizatione that had sponaored their candidacy, and the deputies vould form caucuses accordingly. Once this solution begina to vork, it vili be poesible to vork out alao the rulee fór the formation of delegationa in the National Assembly. 1.3 Public Oversight of the Government There is already partial oversight vhen the government is accountable to the National Assembly. Thia must be enaured in part by the groving independence of the intereat-representing organizations, and in part by instituting procedurea fór reconciling conflicta of interest (6ee Section 3, belov). Hovever, there is alsó need fór mechanisms that piacé the government and its public administration under direct public scrutiny. te * i?
