1987. Különkiadvány, 1987.10.01 / HU_BFL_XIV_47_2
definition of these prerogatives vould end the illusion that the National Assembly is the aole repository of aupreme atate powers. Bút this vay the legislative branch vould at least exclusively poesess somé supreme powers. This possibility vili become reality vhen the National Assembly develops intő a strong institution to vhich the government and its apparatuses are accountable. Power to regulate fundamental legal relationships must be restored to the National Assembly.- It must be the National Assembly's prerogative to enact regulátions that affect civil rights or the interests of larger social groups. Decrees of the executive branch should nőt substitute fór lavs enacted by the National Assembly.- Lavs should nőt confine themselves to outlining the principles of regulation, leaving actual regulation to the executory instructions of government agencies. The government and its apparatuses must be accountable to the National Assembly.- The Council of Ministers could assume Office only upon a vote of confidence in the National Assembly.- The cases vili have to be defined vhen the government must ask fór a vote of confidence (fór example, vhen the government'a program, medium-range plán, annual budget or its report on the fulfillment of any of the preceding is voted dovn). Deputies should be able to introduce motions of no confidence in other instances as véli.- The National Assembly should oversee the nationvide business, scientific, cultural and mass-communications monopolies. The National Assembly, fór example, should appoint nőt only the president of the Central bank, bút alsó the chief executives of the energy industry trusts, of the preferential large investment projects, and of Hungárián Rádió and Hungárián Television. A separate Information Committee of the National Assembly should oversee the activities of the State1s mass-communications agencies and the political press in generál.- Vhen necessary, the National Assembly should have authority to set up a committee of experts to monitor the government's activity. Fór example, such emergencies vould arise vhen there is a threat of external insolvency, or vhen Bome large investment project vith an exceptional environmental and economic impact is being planned, like the Bos[Gabcikovo]-Nagymaros dams. The committee should report to the National Assembly at regular intervals, and its reports and recommendations should be published in the press. The organizational and procedúrái prerequisites must be en6ured fór the emergence of a strong National Assembly. Ij % * 17
