Fáklyaláng, 1960. október (1. évfolyam, 3. szám)
1960-10-23 / 3. szám
The coming presidential election will determine what our answer to the Communist challenge shall be? Will we choose a strategy of victory, or shall our moral and material resources be squandered by Radicals rallying around Senator Kennedy? Our next President will have to decide the crucial issue raised last year by Khrushchev at Camp David, whether a twopower wolrd shall be rejected or established, and in the latter event, through a new Yalta deal between the U.S.A. and the Soviets? Termination of the Cold War was offered by Khrushchev on the condition that the Soviet "sphere of influence" in Europe be expanded in conformity with the shift of the balance of power in favor of Russia, since the Yalta Conference. Should this offer be accepted by the U. S. A., Berlin will become the first victim of our new policy of surrender. With the Berlin roadblock removed, the Soviets could start at any time their advance to the Atlantic Ocean without having to risk a war. For a disillusioned Germany, together with France and the remainder of Europe, would soon feel compelled to seek safety through accomodation with the power dominating Europe, as has happened in Hitler's time. If you betray a friend, you don't lose one friend, you lose every friend. The grave danger threatening America is not war, but for the sake of peace, step by step surrender. Khrushchev does not want war either; he firmly believes that he can get everything he wants if he succeeds in maneuvering America into isolation, following our eventual loss of Europe. Isolated America in a hostile world, would be forced to depend increasingly upon partnership with the Soviets and such a situation would lead to gradual surrender. This is the real ourpose of the offer which Khrushcev made to America at Camp David, promising peaceful coexistence thereafter. This scheme was thwarted, according to Khrushchev's own admission, by he resolute opposition of Vice President Nixon. Frustrated, Khrushchev blew up the Paris Conference with a bang, to the regret of our appeasers, expressed at that time by Adtai tevenson. The Communist press behind the Iron Curtain [ e.g. Népszabadság in Budapest], raised Stevenson while he was running for the nomination, as a "realist whose program reckons ✓ ith the existing forces of our time." Unquestionably, Stevenson and his followers are being considered by Khrushchev as future partners amenable at a Summit Conference to the acceptance of his proposed expansion of the Soviet Empire. Stevenson has criticised Adenauer for his "rigidity" . He and his radical group seem to _>e willing to yield on Berlin, and they would not be disturbed by a weakening of Germany either, which they continue to dislike. They hold that by accepting Khrushchev's offer, we might arrive at disarmament, remove the threat of an atomic war, and achieve lasting peace. They have learned nothing from Munich where, in Churchill's words, by choosing dishonor Chamberlain precipitated war; nor do they keep in mind the tragic consequences of the Yalta Agreement, when every Soviet pledge was broken before President Roosevelt reached the snores of America. They are unaware that there is no easy way out of our predicament, least of all at th expense of our allies. Prodded by Mr. Chester Bowles, they chose to ignore that peace cannot be bought with any amount of dollars. One thing they never seem to remember: lasting peace must be deserved. In Connecticut, on a granite rock in the seaport of Mystic, an inscription recalls the spirit which animated the whalers of the sailing boat, Charles W. Morgan, tossed about on the seven seas for a hundred years. It was the resolve of those sailors, and more than ever it has to remain our resolve in these dangerous days: " T ha t a people inspired under God with a strong sense of individual worth and personal responsibility, may work out their destiny unaided and unafraid. Stout hearts make a safe ship". Tibor Eckhardt
