Az Eszterházy Károly Tanárképző Főiskola Tudományos Közleményei. 1998. [Vol. 5.] Eger Journal of American Studies. (Acta Academiae Paedagogicae Agriensis : Nova series ; Tom. 25)

Studies - Tamás Magyarics: From the Rollback of Communism to Building Bridges: The U.S. and the Soviet Block Countries from the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 to the Prague Spring in 1968

the UN to discuss the "Hungarian question" on June 27, 1957. John Foster Dulles sent out a circular to the American representations around the world in which let them know the goals of the American delegation in the UN: (1) with the help of the report of the Committee of Five to refute the Soviets' account of the events in Hungary; (2) to have the report accepted by the General Assembly in general, and by the Asian countries in particular, so as to undermine Soviet positions in the world; and (3) to make the secret trials held in Budapest against the revolutionaries public.

2' In reality, the U.S. maintained its strict opposition to the acceptance of the mandate of the Hungarian delegation, which slowly became a liability to the West in the EastWest relations. The British Foreign Secretary, Selvyn Lloyd warned the Americans on November 26, 1957 that "many delegations at the UN in all geographical groups are at present very anxious to avoid anything likely to increase East-West tension Moreover, the problem of the Hungarian primate, József Mindszenty, who fled to the American Embassy in November 1956 and eventually stayed there until 1971, could also trigger a "major quarrel ... /which/ might upset the present delicate balance in Poland by forcing Gomulka and the Polish Catholics to take sides .,."

2

9 The expulsion of the Hungarians from the UN might have resulted in the expulsion of the Western diplomats from Budapest, and that was not in the interest of the U.S. or any other Western country as the Hungarian capital was one of the most important outposts of them in the satellite countries. With the death of the implacable Dulles, the "gradualists" gained the upper hand in the State Department and the attacks on the Soviets and their Hungarian stooges became more and more restrained. The incoming Kennedy Administration did not wish to risk its new policies toward the countries of Asia and Africa; finally, as a result of the talks started between the Americans and the Hungarians in October 1962, the U.S. dropped the "Hungarian question" from the agenda of the UN and the Hungarian government simultaneously proclaimed amnesty to those still in prison because of their activities in 1956. The case was worth discussing in details because it casts a light on the interplay of the 2

7 ibid. :

s FRUS. UN and General Matters. Vol. II. 1958-1960. Washington. D.C., 1988. 78-80. 2<

) Eisenhower, op. cit. 507. 79