Az Eszterházy Károly Tanárképző Főiskola Tudományos Közleményei. 1998. [Vol. 5.] Eger Journal of American Studies. (Acta Academiae Paedagogicae Agriensis : Nova series ; Tom. 25)
Studies - Tamás Magyarics: From the Rollback of Communism to Building Bridges: The U.S. and the Soviet Block Countries from the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 to the Prague Spring in 1968
to Poland and the support of a few cultural exchange programs were still at variance with the professed goal of the U.S., namely, the destruction of Communist power in Eastern-Europe. In Brzezinski's reading, 1956 could be attributed to the "spirit of Geneva", i. e. it was the early détente that undermined Soviet political hegemony in Eastern Europe and the continuation of the relaxation of tensions would bring about the final collapse of Communism and not the confrontational style of the Republican administrations in the 1950s. Nevertheless, détente should not mean primarily the relaxation of economic relations: nowhere did economic aid bring about the political and social liberalization of a given country; for instance, opposition to the Soviet dominance started both in Yugoslavia and in Poland before American economic aid was extended to them —later the liberalization of the Hungarian political life was also introduced without any American financial pressure in 1962-1963. The solution should be a dual American policy: on one hand, the East-European regimes should be accepted as they were, on the other, the peoples living under their domination should be separated from them. In practice, it would amount to the maintenance of the formal relations and the encouragement and extension of the informal ones; in other words, the regimes should be "softened up" from within within the , 1 o lramework ol a "peaceful coexistence". 1 In particular, the West should (1) promote the appearance of "national communisms"; thus (2) enhance the chances of the East-European countries to loosen their ties with the USSR; and (3) ultimately create a neutral zone in the region ("Finlandization"). This program needed patient, long-ranging policies: evolution should be the goal instead of forceful "liberation". 1 9 George F. Kennan became famous for his Long Telegram in 1946 and his article signed as "X" in the Foreign Affairs next year. In the wake of the Polish and Hungarian events in 1956 he modified his "containment" policy and broached the idea of "disengagement". Later, he became Ambassador to Belgrad but resigned in 1963 because of the trade restrictions imposed by the U.S. Congress concerning Yugoslavia. Upon returning, he proposed that instead of the bipolar world as conceived in the early years of the Cold War, a 1 8 ibid. 644-645. |l ) Kennan. George F. "Polycentrism and Western Policy". Foreign Affairs. Vol. 42, No. 2 (January 1964). 171-183. 75
