Az Eszterházy Károly Tanárképző Főiskola Tudományos Közleményei. 1998. [Vol. 5.] Eger Journal of American Studies. (Acta Academiae Paedagogicae Agriensis : Nova series ; Tom. 25)
Studies - Tamás Magyarics: From the Rollback of Communism to Building Bridges: The U.S. and the Soviet Block Countries from the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 to the Prague Spring in 1968
The gradual shift in the assessment of the East-West relations made itself felt in the area of the economic relations, too. The Administration argued after 1956 that "national Communism" was kept in existence in Yugoslavia mainly because Tito opened up the country for more intensive trade relations with the West. Cautious steps were taken by the Administration in this field: for instance, the Rumanian Deputy Minister for Financial Affairs, Radu Manescu and Assistant Secretary of State Foy D. Kohler signed an agreement on March 30, 1960 to settle the outstanding financial questions between the two countries. The agreement was important for the Rumanians because under the stipulations of the Johnson Act of 1934 no country could get American loans which had outstanding financial questions with the U.S." Later, the Hungarians, the Czechoslovaks, and the Bulgarians were also forced to enter into negotiations regarding unsettled financial issues with the U.S. because they increasingly needed the American or international loans and credits to stabilize their economies. This endeavor became one of the sources of the basic disagreement between the U.S. and the countries related to above: while the latter sought economic advantages, the U.S. had no special interest in promoting trade for its own sake. As Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Thomas G. Mann declared: "... From a purely economic standpoint, the true limitation on the magnitude of U.S. exports to Eastern Europe is the ability of these countries to earn 1 ^ dollars through exports to the LI.S. or other hard-currency markets." ~ It was the Polish who had the most intense economic relations with the U.S. —besides Yugoslavia —from among the East-European states and their experience in this field frequently served as a yardstick for the other satellites. The American Ambassador to Warsaw claimed in his memoirs that the Polish Ambassador to Washington. D.C. Spasowski had a meeting in the State Department on October 20, 1956 where he told the Americans that Gomulka had to implement economic reforms and he would not decline assistance from abroad. Four days later the American representation in Warsaw approached the Polish leaders with an offer, but the Polish Foreign Minister Józef Winievicz rejected "aid" and declared that Poland was more interested in the restoration of the most favored nation treatment. The " DSB. Vol. XLII, No. 1093. June 6, 1960. 931. 1 2 Report of the Special Study Mission to Europe on the Policy toward the Satellite Nations. Washington. D.C., 1957. 10.
