Az Eszterházy Károly Tanárképző Főiskola Tudományos Közleményei. 1998. [Vol. 5.] Eger Journal of American Studies. (Acta Academiae Paedagogicae Agriensis : Nova series ; Tom. 25)
Studies - Tamás Magyarics: From the Rollback of Communism to Building Bridges: The U.S. and the Soviet Block Countries from the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 to the Prague Spring in 1968
Europe and a non-agression treaty between the NATO and the Warsaw Pact, while President Eisenhower in his reply on January 12, 1958 proposed the termination of the veto right of the great powers in the Security Council, the unification of Germany after free elections, the free choice of the form of government in Eastern-Europe as stipulated at Yalta, and the termination of the arms race. The points relevant to Central-Europe were picked up by others as well: the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Adam Rapacki broached the idea of a nuclear-free Central Europe, while George F. Kennan in his Reith-lectures on the BBC elaborated on the theme of "disengagement", that is the mutual withdrawal of troops from the region. As the Western leadership believed that either of the plans would give unilateral advantages to the Soviets in the military field, neither of them was accepted. Instead, the NSC spelt out the mainlines of the new American goals in Central-Europe in the spring of 1958. The report declared that "the Soviet control over the region ... is ...a threat to peace and to /the/ security of the U. S. and Western Europe. ... Poland's ability to maintain the limited independence gained in October 1956 will be a key factor affecting future political development in Eastern Europe /and Yugoslavia/ ... The current ferment in Eastern-Europe offers new opportunities, though still limited, to influence the dominated regimes through greater U.S. activity, both private and official, in such fields as tourist travel, cultural exchange and economic relations, including exchanging of 7 technical and commercial visitors." The report warned that major East-West agreements would run the greatest risk, so the policy of "small steps" should be preferred in this situation. As for Hungary, the NSC maintained that because the country had become an important psychological factor in the world struggle, the U.S. policy pursued here should not compromize the "symbol" which Hungary had become. The Eisenhower Administration thought that field to yield the greatest success might be that of the economic relations: on August 14, 1958 the administration announced the reduction of controls on exports to Soviet bloc countries. 8 The initial steps were rather promising for the Americans, at least as far as Poland was concerned. The Department of State Bulletin (DSB). Vol. XXXIX, No. 1002. September 8, 1958. 392. s Gardner. Lloyd C. A Covenant with Power. New York-Toronto, 1984. 125. 69
