Az Eszterházy Károly Tanárképző Főiskola Tudományos Közleményei. 1993. [Vol. 1.] Eger Journal of American Studies. (Acta Academiae Paedagogicae Agriensis : Nova series ; Tom. 21)

BOOK REVIEWS - John C. Chalberg: August Heckscher: Woodrow Wilson. Macmillan, 1991. 734 pp

inkling as to what was in store for him: "As martyrs before him had gone to their martyrdom, Woodrow Wilson went half-knowingly, not entirely cheerless, and ready to put up a good fight." Furthermore, this martyr went into the lion's den "an essentially modest man," uninterested in fighting alone and ready to make common cause with and left-liberals everywhere. In fact, in the early stages of the conference Wilson gave no hint of playing the martyr at all, but operated as a "model of open-minded, if determined, rationalism." The rational approach was already at the work in the collectivity of the Inquiry, a stable of American experts on whom the "open-minded" Wilson "relied heavily." ("Show me the right and I will fight for it.") Wilson was also prepared to fall back on his well-tested skills as a persuader and negotiator. It was almost as though the old Woodrow Wilson had been born anew. Far from being overcome by

—or misreading the adulation of

—the European masses, Wilson understood the French need for security and worked to form a "sincere friendship" with French Premier Georges Clemenceau. At the same time, Wilson saw the League of Nations as a "vital thing

—not merely a formal thing." In his view the League was not to be restricted to enforcing the treaty. And in Heckscher's view Wilson's "overall conviction of the need for the League was certainly correct"

—and not necessarily inimical to either American or French national interests. In fact, Wilson's self-imposed task in the first phase of the conference was to imbed the League in the Treaty. That achieved, he returned to the United States in early March. But any initial success that Wilson enjoyed was not to be repeated when the conference reconvened in April. Why? In Wilson's occasionally paranoiac mind the fault lay with Colonel House, who "ha(d) given away everything (Wilson) had won before (he) left Paris." Here was Wilson betrayed yet again

—and by no less than another trusted ally whom the president loved like a brother. In truth, Wilson's conference colleagues used the League to exact concessions, concessions Wilson presumed would be corrected by a "vital" League. But for the time being Wilson was at the mercy of the "extremism of French 162