Az Eszterházy Károly Tanárképző Főiskola Tudományos Közleményei. 1993. [Vol. 1.] Eger Journal of American Studies. (Acta Academiae Paedagogicae Agriensis : Nova series ; Tom. 21)

STUDIES - Csaba Czeglédi: On Constative and Performative Utterances

What Austin meant by the sensitivity of constatives to the true

—false distinction was that "in ordinary cases, for example running, it is the fact that he is running which makes the statement that he is running true, or again, that the truth of the constative utterance 'he is running' depends on his being running" (p. 47). On the other hand, Austin notes that constatives are not only true or false but there are other ways in which they can go wrong. For example, the statement "The present King of France is bald" (p. 20) is neither true, nor false. What is wrong with it is that a presupposition which is associated with it is not met. Constative utterances which are neither true nor false are thus similar to performatives (in that they are neither true nor false). Furthermore, Austin says, "there are obvious similarities between a lie and a false promise" (p. 20). It turns out then that some utterances which we would like to consider constatives are insensitive to the true

—false distinction and appear to be similar to performatives. Austin argues, on the other hand, that some performative utterances are characterized by "an obvious slide towards truth or falsity" (p. 141). He claims that "we may: estimate rightly or wrongly . . . find correctly or incorrectly ... pronounce correctly or incorrectly" (p. 141). Furthermore, there are utterances that must be considered performative but cannot be characterized in terms of the familiar felicity conditions. It is something else that goes wrong with them. This is how Austin characterizes them (p. 55): . . . connected with the performative (I presume it is one) 'I warn you that the bull is about to charge' is the fact, if it is one, that the bull is about to charge: if the bull is not, then indeed the utterance 'I warn you that the bull is about to charge' is open to criticism

—but not in any of the ways we have hitherto characterized as varieties of unhappiness. We should not in this case say the warning was void

—i.e. that he did not warn but only went through a form of warning

—nor that it was insincere: we should feel much more inclined to say the warning was false or (better) mistaken, as with a statement. So that considerations of the happiness and 13