Magyar külpolitika, 1930 (11. évfolyam, 1-7. szám)

1930 / 2. szám - The customs convention conference in Geneva

Budapest July 1930 CHIEF EDITORS: GYULA DE PÉKÁR, BÁRON JOSEPH SZTERÉNYI PRINCIPAL CONTEIMTS Báron Joseph Szterényi: The customs convention conference in Geneva A. B. Yolland : The Hungárián Regency and its present Holder 17 20 The customs convention conference in Geneva. by Báron Joseph Szterényi. The only persans likely to have reposed any Berious hopes in the recent Customs Conference held in Geneva are those who are either ignorant of both the Geneva atmosphere and the conditions prevailing in this part of Europe or consider the latter as of no importance.1 So far there has not béén any open manifeslalion anywhere of a conseiousness of necessity. At least not on the part of the competent factors with whom the decision rests: there is no sign of any such conviction on tlie part of either governments or paiiiamcnts. Particularisation in respect of tendencios and aims still continues to be stronger than the feeling of the necessity of common action. Grave though thcy may be, conditions have not yet developed so far as to act decisively to impel the recognition of the community of interests. And tliis is the sole and only explanation of the undoubted Fiasco in which the recenl Geneva Customs Conference ended. The thirty-three States represented al the Conference stood in all essentials for three divergent groups of interests, — free trade, industrial protectionism, and manufacturing industrial protectionism. The members of the Eirsl group represented the righl wing of the Conference and aimed at arriving at an agreement. For them an agreemcnt would not have involved any sacrifice, but wouid on the contrary have meant an approach to the economic tendency for which they stand. Here their interests agree with those of the industrial States, which aim at obtaining guarantees in respect of the endeavours of their export markets to advance the scale of their customs dutiés, without however laking into account the export interests of the third gioup, the agrarian States. With such manifest conflicts of interests there could be no doubt fhat this international Conference was doomed in advance to failure; and the grávity of the situation was further heightenéd by the fact that the industrial countries were desiroüs of brihging their own more moderato tariffs into harmony with those of the countries employing higher rates before agree!ing to bind themselves for two years or even for a single year. Moreover, I have not even mentionod the almost inévitable politieal interests to be found in the background of the question of agreements of the kinti, — interests which generally divide in .accordance with the politieal grouping of States. On the present occasion T have no intention of treating seperately of these interests, as I desire to deal with the question strictly and exclusively from the economic viewpoint and in the light of economic policy. The plan of a Customs Convention and the Geneva Conferenoe convened for the purpöse of materialising the plan, originated from the consideration — the judieiousness of which is beyond dispute — that the maintenance of the [economic structure at present prevailing in Europe |not only precludes every possibility of any improve'nient of the economic conditions, but renders inévitable a further deterioration thereof. This is an open acknowledgement of what wé have from the very outset declared and professed, — viz. that the Treaties of Peace which put an end to the War on-paper are the chief sources and records responsible Por the economic destruction of Europe; ignoring the most elementary economic postulates, these treaties dissected large economic units into innumerable tiny independent parts which — liaving been converted into jpolitical units by the War which broughl them into being—. would like to be economic units too, seeing that their war mentality makes them believe that they are eachof them destined to enjöy icconomic autarchy. That this is an economic absurdity, 'does not matter. 11 is not the only absurdity in the treaties of peace. Apart from the natural destruction of values