Magyar külpolitika, 1930 (11. évfolyam, 1-7. szám)

1930 / 7. szám - The Question of Revision

December 1930 HUNGÁRIA LLOYD 23 as yet arrived in Kolozsvár. The observation of the provisions stipulated in the armistice was in advance made impossible by the proceedings of the Czeeh, Rumanian and Serbian Governments in usurping the rule over the oceupied territories in public contravention of the Hague Convention, and by having at once definitely annexed the territories in question. They made no secret of their decision to wrench away from the Associated and Allied Powers, on whose instruction and in whose name the occupation took place, the territories oceupied by their own troops, holding them on their responsihility but without any obligations on their own part. This occupation took place at the end of 1918, at a time when the American Government still insisted thai the fate of Austria and that of Hungary should be dealt with separately. When it became clear to President Wilson that his peaee conditions, which had alerady been accepted by the enemy, were not to be applied, he declared that he could regard the peace conference only as a preliminary pourparler of the Associated and Allied Powers which must later on be followed by a real and serious peace conference. It was then that he concieved the idea that a reasonable and just adjustment of the Austro-Hungarian question should be incorporated into the statutes of the League of Nations. When, however, this very stipulation wras cancelled in WTilson's project, Lord Róbert Cecil, the British Statesman, desired to empower the League of Nations, then being organized, to revise the peace treaties from time to time, adapting their provisions to the requirement of the age. Can we imagine a more radical objection than the fact that when even this proposition was wrecked, the American Congress threw aside the Parisian treaties and concluded with the Central Powers a separate treaty which did not include the frontier lines drawn in the Parisian treaties. Simultaneously with the abandonment of the Parisian treaties is it possible to overlook the endeavour to remedy their great constructional faults by introducing small improvements, making it quite obvious that their fauls were admitted even by those who committed them"? Shall we not mention the Millerand letter signed by the French Republic, for the sole purpose of awakening in the distressed Hungárián nation somé hope of the alteration of the peace conditions? This hope, it is true, came to naught when orders were issued to the contrary, after — on the strength of the Millerand letter — the Hungárián Government had signed the treaty, in the supposition that the Associated Powers could only ma ke the armistice and lacked the necessary power to conclude the peace treaties. In the end, however, the Allied Powers merely gave effect to their carte-blanche promises to the Governments interested in the annexation. This becomes obvious when it is remembered that when at the Parisian conference Lloyd George, the British Prime Minister, questioned the Rumanian Prime Minister concerning the Rumanian population of Transylvania he was given the laconic information that Rumania's purpose of war was to compel the Hungárián minority in Transylvania by force of arms, to accept their authority. Bratianu was clever enough to turn the weapon against the Allied Powers and to protest against their interference with Rumania's internál affairs. He was, however, assured that there was no question of any interference whatsoever, because Rumania would be a member of the League of Nation and as such would be in a position there to represent the interests of its own State. The interests of the Governments participating in the annexation were considerably advanced by the fact that they had previously succeeded in cancelling many provisions apart from the Millerand letter, by means of orders issued in their favour and to the disadvantage of the Great Powers and to the detriment of the peace treaties, by the Council of Ambassadors, a Corporation unknown to and not accepted by international law. Further considerable support was given to them by the unanimous cancellation of Article 19 of the Status of the League of Nations, which offered somé slight hope for a revision and was interpreted in this sense alsó by Count Albert Apponyi, the president of the Hungárián Peace Delegation, whose interpretation was not objected to by the Prime Ministers of the Great Powers. This article incidentally was one of the inducements to the Hungárián Government to sign the peace treaty. In the foregoing we have enumerated all the divergences, the formai and constructual faults, which fully justify a revision of the peace treaties, nevertheless we cannot expect any initiative steps from the powers, even if we quote the statement of Lord Balfour who, as one of the authors of the peace treaties, when submitting them to the British House of Commons, admitted that the authors of the treaties had made mistakes. WTe wish, however, to remind them of the fact of which they themselves are quite aware that there are many legal diserepancies between the armistice concluded on November 3rd 1918, and the separate treaty made with the United States of America in 1921, which ultimately can be attributed to no other reason than that the Western Powers did not concern themselves with the Central European questions. Russia, the power which was chiefly interested in the fate of Central-Europe, which she wished to settle by force of arms, no longer existed. If, therefore, the Western Powers have adopted peace terms originally based on the arbitration of guns, imposing them by means of the democratic forces of Western mentality, then they must have converted their own democracy to the same spirit of conquering militarism, whose cndeavour it was to put into effect the U'ussian peace terms which open the way to unlimited military preparation. They themselves should be the best judges os to whether this is competible with the interests of Europe and whether it may be considered a safe basis for future peace. Our sole aim is to show that the Parisian peace treaties separated and set against each other certain peoples which have always lived together in the course of history. The Governments interested in the annexation were able to make the Allied Powers accept these treaties, and to disperse their anxiety concerning them by persuading the Powers that these provisions alone would compensate for the collapse of the ruined Double Monarchy. According to public opinion the experiment has not been successful and we béliévé that there is no