Amerikai Magyar Értesítő, 1984 (20. évfolyam, 1-12. szám)
1984-10-01 / 10. szám
18.oldal fvai Magyar Értesítő 1984. október THE WALL STREET JOURNAL Arms-Control Realities Walter Mondale wants it known that he favors a “mutual, verifiable nuclear freeze." None of these buzzwords, however, gets us very far In terms of a real debate on how to achieve substantive agreements with the Soviets. To get beyond superficiality, it is necessary to address the nettlesome problems of verification and compliance. The Soviets cheat. They have consistently violated bilateral and international arms-control agreements. The U.S. in the 1970s made concessions in the vain hope of changing Soviet behavior. The Reagan administration decided instead to bargain from strength and has received far more support from Democrats them the “freeze” talk in San Francisco suggested. U.S. negotiating teams, led by Gen. Edward Rowny and Paul Nitze, find, not unexpectedly, that they are taken far more seriously when the West shows it has the political will to defend itself. The Reagan administration also has believed it prudent to assess Soviet violations. A newly completed, still-classified report makes clear that verification and compliance can never be mere modifiers of the word “freeze" but are a primary issue. Entitled “A Quarter Century of Soviet Compliance Practices Under Arms Control Commitments: 1958-1983," the study was conducted by President Reagan's General Advisory Committee (GAC) on Arms Control and Disarmament, composed of distinguished outside experts led by William R. Graham. It documents Soviet arms: control violations dating back to 1961 and, indeed, escalating during the SALT heyday of the 1970s. The commission found 17 “material breaches" by the Soviet Union involving nine treaties and four "international commitments,” according to a classified summary of the report obtained by the Journal. Of the 17 breaches, seven involved SALT. In addition, the commission cited 10 “suspected" violations, for which data were insufficient to reach a firm conclusion. Of the 10 non-SALT violations by the Soviet Union, it lists: • The unilateral breach of the moratorium on nuclear testing in 1961- 1962; • The positioning of offensive weapons in Cuba in 1962; • Violations of the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 by extraterritorial venting of radiation from 1965 to the present; • Deployment of nuclear-missile- type submarines in Cuban waters in 1970-1974; • Violations of the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972 from the date it was signed until the present; • Breaches of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 banning the transfer of chemical weapons for first use against non- party countries; • Transit of aircraft carriers through the Turkish Straits since 1976 in violation of the Montreux Convention of 1936; • Failure to provide advance notice of military exercises from September 1981 to June 1982 in breach of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975; • The use of booby-trap mines and incendiary devices against civilians in Afghanistan in 1981 and 1982 in violation of the Conventional Weapons Convention of 1981; • The completion of SS-20 launcher positions in 1982 and 1983, unilaterally breaching Leonid Brezhnev’s commitment to a deployment moratorium on these intermediate-range missiles aimed at Europe. The seven violations of the SALT I, SALT II and Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaties from 1972 to the present are: • Deployment of medium Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), the SS-19 and SS-17; • Deliberate concealment activities impeding verification; • Development and deployment of mobile ABM radars; • Deployment of modem submarines exceeding the limit of 740 ballistic missile submarine launchers without dismantling other ICBM or submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers; • “Probable continued deployment” of SS-16 mobile ICBMs and launchers at Plesetsk; • Testing of the SS-X-25, a second new ICBM, in “probable violation" of SALT II; • Construction of large, non-peripheral, battle-management-type ABM radars. The GAC panel’s main conclusion finds a “recurring pattem of Soviet violations since 1972" and an all-out deception and concealment campaign to mislead the U.S. about the true extent of the Soviet military buildup. Indeed, the violations may go beyond the 17 breaches listed above. The study also cites 10 “suspected" violations, of which “several could have major military significance.” For instance, it says that a "Soviet program now seems to be pursuing genetic engineering for new agents." These weapons, it says, would be so “unique" that the “West may remain ignorant of their properties” and thus they could have “potential serious The GAC panel’s main conclusion finds a “recurring pattem of Soviet violations since 1972” and an all-out deception and concealment campaign to mislead the U.S. about the true extent of the Soviet military buildup. Indeed, the violations may go beyond the 17 breaches listed above. The study also cites 10 "suspected" violations, of which "several could have major military significance." For instance, it says that a "Soviet program now seems to be pursuing genetic engineering for new agents.” These weapons, it says, would be so “unique” that the "West may remain Ignorant of their properties” and thus they could have "potential serious consequences” for Western defense. In terms of the ABM violations, the commission further remarks that the “Soviet actions are consistent with an ABM ‘breakout’ capability’ and the “covert use of air defense systems to enhance ABM capability." The installation of an effective Soviet ABM system would significantly alter the strategici bgjance. Other hidden dangers: The $AG study notes that the Soviets mayihave concealed “extra stored misales” on land and on submarines.. How does the U.S. deal with such a regime? After assessing the threat posed by Soviet cheating, the U.S. has to either develop countermeasures or abrogate treaties and build the weapons Itself. Indeed, Zbigniew Brzezinski, former national security adviser to President Carter, recently wrote on this page that continued reliance on arms control may be fruitless and that the U.S. should rely more on strategic defense systems. In the long run, the answer is to maintain such a multifaceted, surviv- able and credible defense that no end of Soviet cheating will yield any hope of superiority. In the words of a draft Republican platform plank, “Agreements must be verifiable, but verification is not enough to prevent Soviet violations. To deter violations, we must continue to rebuild America’s strength and maintain the will to respond.” Congress has passed a measure calling on President Reagan to release the GAC report to Congress. It deserves a thorough public hearing as well during this election year. If Mr. Mondale Is serious about debating arms control we urge him to get a copy. * * * The U.S. and Israel smashed a counterfeiting ring, officials said. Ten emigre Jews from Soviet Georgia were arrested in New York and Tel Aviv on charges of printing $13 million in phony U.S. bills: another surrendered later. The ring had enough paper to print over $100 million of U.S. currency, officials said. More arrests were planned.
