Amerikai Magyar Értesítő, 1982 (18. évfolyam, 1-12. szám)

1982-07-01 / 7-8. szám

1982. jul. aug. a. m. értesítő 19 Diplomats Act Undiplomatically; More Russians Are Ousted as Spies * * # Explanations Include Poland, Afghan War, Carelessness And Simply More Spying By Gkkai.d F. Sum Staff Reporter of Tin: Wai.i. Stkkkt Jiuhnai. WASHINGTON - A most undiplomatic thing is happening to Soviet diplomats. More of them are getting kicked out of host coun­tries. The U.S., for example, recently ousted a top Soviet military officer for obtaining clas­sified information. Canada expelled a Rus­sian official after charging that he offered a businessman "large sums of money” to buy sensitive, restricted technology. Even tiny Singapore recently expelled a Soviet diplo­mat for posing as a Swedish journalist and trying to buy security information. So far this year, 11 countries have given the heave-ho to 19 Soviet representatives, in­cluding a few quasi-official employes of Aeroflot, the U.S.S.R.'s airline. In April alone, six different countries revealed that they had expelled Soviet representatives. Some of the expulsions are handled dis­creetly; Britain, for example, tossed out a Soviet trade official in February but didn’t announce the action until April. Others are messy. In Indonesia, the expulsion of a So­viet official was marked by an airport brawl between Russian diplomats and Indonesian security aides, one of whom was allegedly bitten by a Russian wife during the scuffle. Thirty Last Year All this hasn’t escaped the watchful eye of the U.S. government, which keeps tabs on the expulsions. The State Department re­cently compiled a study for American offi­cials showing that 30 Soviet representatives were expelled world wide in 1981, most on espionage charges. The year before, 116 Russians were kicked out-but that number is misleadingly high, because 100 of them were expelled in a single housecleaning by Pakistan. Many more Russians are believed to be expelled quietly, because some host govern­ments don’t want to incite the Kremlin to re- ta iate by kicking their own diplomats out of Moscow. The total number of Soviet expul­sions probably is "substantially higher" than is publicly known, the State Depart­ment stiidy says. Soviet diplomats have been getting ex­pelled periodically "since the days of Lenin,” the State Department paper notes. And it isn't only the Russians who mix intel­ligence and diplomacy. It is no secret that the U.S. uses diplomatic jobs as “over” for some of its agents. For their part, the Sovi­ets indignantly insist that nothing unusual is going on. "I have no observation because I’m not aware of the phenomenon you're re­ferring to," says a spokesman for the Soviet embassy here. ‘Sort of a Boomlet’ But while cautioning that nobody has kept records of such things over the years for comparison, most U.S. analysts agree that the number of recent Soviet departures is bigger than usual. "There's sort of a boomlet there," one State Department ana­lyst says. One reason, U.S. experts assert, is that Soviet agents are branching out into new ac­tivities. Many of the recently departed Com­munist diplomats were caught trying to steal sensitive new technology with military uses or participating in "active measures ” like organizing protest movements. Foreign governments now have an eye open for such endeavors. For example, Denmark expelled a Soviet diplomat last October for arranging to have some 150 Danish artists sign an appeal call­ing for a Nordic nuclear-weapons-free zone, and for supplying money to have the appeal placed as an ad in several newspapers. At about the same time, Egypt was expelling the Soviet ambassador, six other Soviet em­bassy officials and two Soviet correspond­ents on charges of trying to foment domestic strife in the country. Some U.S. officials also think the Rus­sians are getting caught more often because they are getting careless as they expand their horizons. One expert points to the case of a high-level Soviet spy expelled from the U.S. in February. In that case, an American double agent arranged to pass on to the So­viets some supposedly secret U.S. docu­ments during a rendezvous in the parking lot of a Virginia shopping mall. FBI men were hiding nearby, waiting for the exchange to take place. When it did, they swooped in, expecting to nab a middle- level Soviet functionary. Instead they caught Vasily I. Chitov, who is a major general in the Red army and, according to the U.S., a top agent for the Soviet military intelligence agency, the GRU. "Why send a general out to do a pickup?" one U.S. official asks. "You send a clerk out to do something like that." Another factor in the recent expulsions may be the chillier international attitude to­ward the Soviet Union since the Kremlin- backed crackdown in Poland. Expelling a diplomat, and particularly making it known publicly, is often a political protest as much as a counterintelligence action, officials say. Expulsions jumped for a time after the Soviets’ 1979 invasion of Afghanistan, just as they have jumped now. “I think there is a sincere desire on the part of many govern­ments to protest Afghanistan and Poland, and this is one way of doing it,” says a for­mer top U.S. counterintelligence officer. The Representative’s Office U.S. officials also insist that expulsions are rising partly because there are more So­viet spies at work than before. The U.S. estimates that one-third of Mos­cow's 800 diplomats in this country are ac­tually full-time intelligence officers. One Justice Department aide, Richard Willard, charged in a recent speech that whereas the FBI once was able to “match" hostile intel­ligence agents one for one in the U.S., the number of foreign agents has grown so much that FBI agents now are outnumbered three or four to one. Many of these pseudodiplomats spend much time snooping around Capitol HiJJ,, which spies regard as a choice spot to ferret out tidbits of Information. In one memorable episode last fall, a Soviet diplomat brazenly walked into the office of Rep. David Emery, a Republican of Maine, and asked for a copy of an alternative plan that the Congressman had drawn up for basing the MX missile. An aide in the office, John Rabb, turned the Russian away. Mr. Rabb says the FBI later told him that the diplomat, an embassy official named Yuri Petrovich Leonov, was a GRU agent. Brouhaha in Jakarta The Indonesian example is another case in which Soviet indiscretion seems to have backfired and created embarrassing public­ity. In February, Indonesian security offi­cials caught an assistant Soviet military at­tache named Lt. Col. S.P. Egorov passing a camera and film to an Indonesian military officer at a Jakarta restaurant. Indonesia gave Col. Egorov 48 hours to clear out but tried to handle the expulsion quietly. Discretion went out the window, though, when he arrived at the airport to leave. He came accompanied by several other Soviet officials, including G.M. Odartouk, a political attache at the embassy, and Alex­ander Finenko, the head of the local office of the Soviet airline, Aeroflot. Western intelli­gence officials think Mr. Finenko is more than just an airline bureaucrat; they say he is a top GRU officer. When Mr. Finenko tried to accompany Mr. Egorov to the airplane, Indonesian secu­rity officials stopped him. At that point, a scuffle broke out. Indonesian officials said tot Mr. Odariouk, the political attache, hit one airport security guard, while his wife bit, kicked and scratched another. The upshot: Indonesia requested that Mr. Odariouk and Mr. Finenko Join their col­league in returning to Moscow. THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Monday, June 14, 1982 ******* Notable & Quotable Vice President George Bush before the Notional Public Radio Conference in Washington, D.C., recently: The very first proposal for international control of atomic bombs originated in 1945. It was a proposal written by President Truman's Secretary of War, Henry Stim- son. It resulted in authorized approaches to the Soviet Union and Western allies to seek control over atomic weapons while at the same time pursuing peaceful uses of atomic power for "commercial or humani­tarian purposes.” This led to the "Acheson Lilienthal Report," a preliminary report to a plan presented at the United Nations by Bernard Baruch in 1946. The "Baruch Plan" proposed "the crea­tion of an international Atomic Energy De­velopment Authority," to which all aspects of the development and use of atomic en­ergy would have been entrusted. The pro­posal also called for inspections for viola­tions or potential violations. That proposal was rejected by the Sovi ets. It was rejected at a time when the United States was the only nation armed with atomic weapons-three years prior to the development of the atomic bomb bv the Soviets and eight years before they tested their first hydrogen bomb.

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